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Reconsidering the Foregone Conclusion Doctrine:
Compelled Decryption and the Original Meaning of
Self-Incrimination
20 U.N.H. L. Rev. 51 (2021)

The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the government
from compelling an individual “to be a witness against himself.” The Supreme Court of the United
States has long interpreted “witness” as “one who gives testimony.” Undoubtedly, this
interpretation prevents the government from compelling a witness to take the stand and testify to
his own demise. This interpretation also extends to the act of producing documents, giving rise
to the so-called “act of production” doctrine. Yet if a court deems the testimonial value of the act
minimal—in other words, not “sufficiently testimonial”—the government can compel production
under the “foregone conclusion” exception. As technology has advanced, the extension and
application of this doctrine has become increasingly challenging.
Recently, however, two sitting Supreme Court Justices have called into question the entire
act of production doctrine. Specifically, on separate occasions, Justices Thomas and Gorsuch have
indicated a willingness to revisit the meaning of “to be a witness.” In their view, substantial
evidence shows that the original meaning of “to be a witness” was “to furnish evidence.” According
to that reading, the government could no longer compel individuals to “give” evidence. While that
interpretation may be faithful to the text of the Constitution, it may not be practical given recent
technological advances. This Article contributes to recent self-incrimination clause debate by
underscoring the potential difficulties that accompany the application of an original meaning
approach to the “to be a witness” requirement. Namely, in the era of personal data privacy, taking
the doctrine in a different direction may leave us no better off even if the revised path more
faithfully adheres to the text and original meaning of the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination
Clause.
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INTRODUCTION

In the last decade, the judiciary has waded into the national debate about data
security.1 In Riley v. California, for example, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth
Amendment requires a warrant before the government searches the data contents
of a phone.2 That decision left many data security questions unanswered. What
happens, for instance, when the government has a warrant to search the contents
of an iPhone, only to be stopped in its tracks at the lock screen? Can the government
compel the owner of the device to unlock the phone?
The Fifth Amendment prevents a person from being compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself.3 The protection “is limited to criminal matters,
but it is as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard.”4 The breadth of
this privilege has perplexed scholars and courts alike.5 It certainly protects one from
having to take the stand in his own criminal case.6 This protection also has been
interpreted to shield individuals from being compelled to produce documents.7 The
documents themselves, however, receive no protection. Rather, it is the implicit
testimony communicated by the physical act of handing over documents that
anchors in a constitutional safe harbor.8 This protection is commonly referred to as
the “act of production doctrine.” 9 The doctrine applies only when the act is
See David Alpert, Beyond Request-and-Respond: Why Data Access Will Be Insufficient to Tame Big
Tech, 120 Colum. L. Rev. 1215, 1215–17 (2020) (discussing increasing public interest in data
privacy).

1

2

Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014).

3

U.S. Const. amend. V.

4

Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892).

See Thea A. Cohen, Self-Incrimination and Separation of Powers, 100 Geo. L.J. 895, 899–901 (2012)
(“[The privilege] can focus on any or all of four interrelated questions: What person can invoke the
privilege? What is a criminal case? What is compulsion? What is a witness?”).

5

Counselman, 142 U.S. at 562 (“It is impossible that the meaning of the constitutional provision
can only be that a person shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself in a criminal
prosecution against himself. It would doubtless cover such cases; but it is not limited to them. The
object was to ensure that a person should not be compelled, when acting as a witness in any
investigation, to give testimony which might tend to show that he himself had committed a
crime.”).

6

7

Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976) (creating the act of production doctrine).

Id. at 410 (“The act of producing evidence in response to a subpoena nevertheless has
communicative aspects of its own, wholly aside from the contents of the paper produced.”).

8

See generally Mark A. Cowen, The Act of Production Privilege Post-Hubbell: United States v. Ponds
and the Relevance of the “Reasonable Particularity” and “Foregone Conclusion” Doctrines, 17 Geo. Mason
L. Rev. 863, 863–64 (2010).

9
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“testimonial,” permitting the suspect to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights.10
The “foregone conclusion doctrine,” however, provides an exception to the act
of production doctrine. In Fisher v. United States, the Supreme Court propounded
the foregone conclusion exception, allowing the government to compel certain
acts.11 That is, if the testimony implicit in the compelled physical act is of “minimal
testimonial significance,” then the Fifth Amendment does not shield the act of
production.12 Put differently, the government must already know of the possession,
existence, and authentication of documents. The testimony, then, is said to be a
foregone conclusion. But the exception remains underdeveloped and arguably
limited. In fact, the Supreme Court has only opined on this exception in the physical
document production context.
Not all agree on whether the foregone conclusion rationale should extend to
other contexts—namely, encrypted devices. Commentators and lower courts have
struggled with an initial question: is the act of decrypting a device testimonial? 13
Courts have also disagreed as to what, in fact, that potentially testimonial act even
is communicating.14 If the Fifth Amendment does apply to protect against compelled
decryption, courts diverge over whether the foregone conclusion doctrine extends
beyond document production to compelled decryption of passcodes.15 And if the
foregone conclusion doctrine is applicable, courts have disagreed about whether it
applies merely to the passcode, or the underlying documents too.16
Scholarly debate has illuminated these questions and the rationales behind the
different approaches. 17 More recently, two state supreme courts have addressed
whether the foregone conclusion doctrine applies to compelled device decryption.
In Commonwealth v. Davis, a slim majority of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
declined to extend the foregone conclusion exception to compelled decryption,
Fisher, 425 U.S. at 408 (“It is also clear that the Fifth Amendment does not independently
proscribe the compelled production of every sort of incriminating evidence but applies only when
the accused is compelled to make a Testimonial Communication that is incriminating.”).

10

Id. at 411 (“It is doubtful that implicitly admitting the existence and possession of the papers
rises to the level of testimony within the protection of the Fifth Amendment. . . . The existence
and location of the papers are a foregone conclusion and the taxpayers adds little or nothing to the
sum total of the Government’s information by conceding that he in fact has the papers.”).

11

12

See id. at 412.

13

See infra Part II.

14

See infra Part II.B.

15

See infra Part II.

16

See infra Part II.

17

See infra Part II.A.
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holding that the exception was “extremely limited.”18 In 2020, the Supreme Court
of New Jersey in State v. Andrews ultimately sided with the Davis dissent. 19 The
Andrews majority allowed the government to compel the defendant to decrypt his
devices.
From those opinions, one thing is abundantly clear: scant Supreme Court
precedent has misguided courts. The fact is, only one sentence in the Fisher Court’s
decision unpacked the foregone conclusion exception: “[t]he existence and location
of the papers are a foregone conclusion and the taxpayer adds little or nothing to the
sum total of the Government's information by conceding that he in fact has the
papers.”20 Subsequent cases have only briefly mentioned it. Not only have lower
courts been stranded to make inferences about the expanse of this exception, but
also they must determine what handing over a password is saying in the form of
“testimony.” Herein lies a question that will likely shape the exceptions interaction
with data encryption given the originalist bent of the modern Supreme Court: has
the Self-Incrimination clause jurisprudence strayed too far from the constitutional
text?
In Justice Thomas’s words, “In a future case, I would be willing to reconsider
the scope and meaning of the Self-Incrimination Clause.”21 He is not alone. Justice
Gorsuch has also suggested a willingness to revisit the confusing Self-Incrimination
Clause doctrine, because it stems from a misreading of the Constitution’s text. 22 In
so doing, both Justices call into question the entire testimonial versus nontestimonial distinction that has shaped the Self-Incrimination Clause
jurisprudence for decades. In their view, substantial evidence from the founding
shows that the phrase “to be a witness” in the Self-Incrimination Clause was
Commonwealth v. Davis, 220 A.3d 534, 549, 551 (Pa. 2019) (“Indeed, we conclude the
compulsion of a password to a computer cannot fit within this exception.”); see also infra Part II.B.

18

State v. Andrews, 234 A.3d 1254, 1274 (N.J. 2020) (“We agree with the Davis dissent that the
proper focus here is on the Fifth Amendment and that the Fourth Amendment’s privacy
protections should not factor into analysis of the Fifth Amendment’s applicability.”).

19

20

See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976).

United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 49 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“. . . I write
separately to note that this doctrine may be inconsistent with the original meaning of the Fifth
Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause. A substantial body of evidence suggests that the Fifth
Amendment privilege protects against the compelled production not just of incriminating
testimony, but of any incriminating evidence. In a future case, I would be willing to reconsider
the scope and meaning of the Self-Incrimination Clause.”).

21

Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2271 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“. . . [T]here
is substantial evidence that the privilege against self-incrimination was also originally understood
to protect a person from being forced to turn over potentially incriminating evidence.”).

22
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originally understood to mean “to furnish evidence.”23 And so, in theory, the entire
act of production doctrine should give way to the original meaning in the absence of
the testimonial versus non-testimonial distinction. Adopting the originalist
reading propounded by Justices Thomas and Gorsuch would offer broader
protections to criminal defendants—an outcome not uncommon to originalists.24
Namely, the government could no longer compel individuals to produce any
incriminating evidence.
In his work that gained the attention of the Justices, Professor Richard
Nagareda outlines the originalist approach to “to be a witness.” 25 If the original
meaning of “to be a witness” were revived, producing private papers would be
considered “furnishing evidence.” This approach would allow the government to
unilaterally “take,” while prohibiting it from compelling individuals to “give.” Put
differently, the government would have broad power to search and seize, or “take,”
but could no longer compel production, or “giving,” of incriminating documents.
The act of production cases would not survive. That is, the testimonial versus nontestimonial distinction would be obsolete, as would the foregone conclusion mess.
This begs the question whether lower courts should even continue down the
foregone conclusion rabbit hole. Perhaps the compelled device decryption cases
present the proper “future case” that Justice Thomas has been looking for. Justice
Baer of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania seems to suggest so, writing, “Only the
High Court can make the final determination in this regard for purposes of the Fifth
Amendment, and the present case offers an attractive vehicle by which the Court
could do so.”26
While the world has changed due to technological advances, the Constitution
has not. The conservative majority of the Supreme Court could revisit the
Self-Incrimination Clause. At first glance, the “give” versus “take” distinction seems
easier to administer than the testimonial versus non-testimonial regime. That said,
complex questions will arise that need to be answered. While the foregone
conclusion doctrine would not survive the doctrinal shift, there is reason to believe
that certain compelled physical acts would still be permissible. And if that is the
case, what do we make of compelling a defendant to physically enter a passcode? It
may seem like this is compelling one to furnish evidence, but what if the
government already lawfully seized the device and has a valid warrant to search its
23

See generally infra Part II.C.

24

See generally Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68–69 (2004).

Richard A. Nagareda, Compulsion “To be a Witness” and the Resurrection of Boyd, 74 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 1575, 1590–99 (1999).

25

26

See Commonwealth v. Davis, 220 A.3d 534, 555 n. 3 (Pa. 2019) (Bear, J., dissenting).
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contents?
In this Article, I seek to engage with some of these questions. Little doctrine
from an originalist perspective exists to speculate about the future of the
Self-Incrimination Clause. But some cases that are clearly established under the
current regime would move into the proverbial gray area.27 In Part I, I discuss the
current state of the Self-Incrimination Clause and the act of production doctrine. I
then explore the foregone conclusion exception. In Part II, I review debate among
commentators and lower courts, before turning to the dueling cases in Pennsylvania
and New Jersey. After engaging with the confusing debate, I analyze the original
meaning of “to be a witness,” adopted by Professor Nagareda and cited by Justices
Thomas and Gorsuch. In Part III, I conclude by applying the originalist meaning to
the cases in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, and I address some complicated
questions that may accompany this doctrinal shift.
I.

COMPELLED PASSWORD PRODUCTION AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

The Fifth Amendment protects a person from being “compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself . . . .”28 While a pair of sitting Justices on the
Supreme Court of the United States have hinted at revisiting the original meaning
of this clause,29 the Court has not done so for the better part of a century.30 For now,
Supreme Court precedent holds that the language prevents the government from
compelling an individual to produce “testimony.”31 Not only are written and oral
testimony protected, but also physical acts of a communicative nature. 32 This
27

See infra Part III.

28

U.S. Const. amend. V.

Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2271 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); see also
United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 49 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“A substantial body of
evidence suggests that the Fifth Amendment privilege protects against the compelled production
not just of incriminating testimony, but of any incriminating evidence.”).

29

Laurent A. Sacharoff, Unlocking the Fifth Amendment and Encrypted Devices, 87 Fordham L.
Rev. 203, 204–05 (2018) (“Under the hoary, nineteenth century Boyd doctrine, the Court once
intertwined the two amendments into a majestic, overlapping bulwark of protection. . . . In the
last fifty years, however, the Court has sought to melt this powerful alloy, separating each
amendment into complementary, distinct domains.”); see also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
630–31 (1886).

30

Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 589 (1990) (“. . . [T]he privilege [against selfincrimination] ‘protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or
otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature.’” (citing
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966))).

31

32

Id. at 591–92 (citing a string of cases where real or physical evidence could be compelled).
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includes the act of producing documents.33
However, not all document production is protected.34 Only if the act itself is
compelled, incriminating, and testimonial does the privilege against
self-incrimination apply. 35 Yet, even if the act of production includes implied
testimony, the evidence is not necessarily exempt from compulsion.36 That is, if the
implied testimony “adds little or nothing to the sum total of the government’s
information,” it is a foregone conclusion. 37 The government can circumvent the
protection for otherwise testimonial evidence, and thus can compel the act.38 This
workaround is commonly known as the foregone conclusion exception.39
While initially propounded by the Supreme Court in the document production
context, advances in technology have made the exception more relevant, but less
clear.40 Some courts have expanded this doctrine to personal devices, allowing the
government to compel individuals to decrypt their devices.41 The extension of the
33

Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 414 (1976).

34

Id. at 411–14 (allowing for the production of defendant’s tax documents).

Id. at 408 (“It is also clear that the Fifth Amendment does not independently proscribe the
compelled production of every sort of incriminating evidence but applies only when the accused
is compelled to make a Testimonial Communication that is incriminating.”).

35

See id. at 411 (“It is doubtful that implicitly admitting the existence and possession of the
papers rises to the level of testimony within the protection of the Fifth Amendment.”).

36

Id. (“The existence and location of the papers are a foregone conclusion and the taxpayer adds
little or nothing to the sum total of the Government’s information by conceding that he in fact has
the papers.”).

37

Id. (“Under these circumstances by enforcement of the summons no constitutional rights are
touched. The question is not of testimony but of surrender.” (internal citation omitted)).

38

39

See infra. Part I.B.

Bryan H. Choi, The Privilege Against Cellphone Incrimination, 97 Tex. L. Rev. Online 73, 73–77
(2019) (discussing the increasing importance of cellphones); Sacharoff, supra note 30, at 220–22
(highlighting encryption technology on laptops and smartphones).

40

Several recent cases address the issue. See United States v. Apple MacPro Computer, 851 F.3d
238, 249 (3d Cir. 2017) (allowing the government to compel decryption); In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 1335, 1352 (11th Cir. 2012) (denying compelled
decryption); State v. Andrews, 234 A.3d 1254, 1277 (N.J. 2020) (agreeing with jurisdictions that
allow compelled decryption); Seo v. State, 148 N.E.3d 952, 955 (Ind. 2020) (rejecting application of
foregone conclusion exception, not allowing for compelled decryption); Commonwealth v. Davis,
220 A.3d 534, 551 (Pa. 2019) (denying government’s motion to compel decryption); Commonwealth
v. Jones, 117 N.E.3d 702, 707-09 (Mass. 2019) (allowing decryption on state constitutional law
grounds even where art. 12 of the Massachusetts Constitution provided broader protections
against self-incrimination: “[n]o subject shall … be compelled to accuse, or furnish evidence
against himself”).

41
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foregone conclusion doctrine has not been welcomed without debate.42 In this Part,
I will briefly explore the Fifth Amendment act of production doctrine before
analyzing the foregone conclusion exception.
A. The Act of Production Doctrine
The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment has long been
understood to protect individuals against compelled, incriminating testimony. 43
Notably, the text itself does not mention “testimony.”44 Nor does the text establish
the many ways in which a person may be made to incriminate himself. 45 The
privilege, however, has thus far been construed to “protect[] an accused only from
being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with
evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature.” 46 To be testimonial, “the
communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or
disclose information.”47
The Supreme Court elaborated on this act of production doctrine in Fisher v.
United States.48 The facts of Fisher are straightforward, and the case has been covered
United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 44 (2000) (questioning the scope of the foregone
conclusion rationale); see also Orin S. Kerr, Compelled Decryption and the Privilege Against SelfIncrimination, 97 Tex. L. Rev. 767 (2019) (applying the foregone conclusion exception to device
passwords); Choi, supra note 40, at 73–77 (disagreeing with both Kerr and Sacharoff, while
defining the cell phone as an “extension of self”). But see Laurent Sacharoff, What Am I Really Saying
When I Open My Smartphone? A Response to Orin S. Kerr, 97 Tex. L. Rev. Online 63 (disagreeing with
Kerr’s definition and application of the foregone conclusion rationale).

42

Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 588–89 (1990) (“[W]e have long held that the privilege
does not protect a suspect from being compelled by the State to produce ‘real or physical evidence.’
Rather, the privilege ‘protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or
otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature.’” (citing
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761–64 (1966))); see also Robert P. Mosteller, Simplifying
Subpoena Law: Taking the Fifth Amendment Seriously, 73 Va. L. Rev. 1, 6 (1987) (“It is firmly
established that the [F]ifth [A]mendment is violated only if the defendant’s conduct is compelled,
testimonial, and incriminating.”).

43

See U.S. Const. amend. V. (“[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself.”); infra Part II.B.

44

See Muniz, 496 U.S. at 591–92 (citing a string of cases that allow for compelled acts); see also
Joseph Jarone, An Act of Decryption Doctrine: Clarifying the Act of Production Doctrine’s Application to
Compelled Decryption, 10 FIU L. Rev. 767, 771–76 (explaining the modern interpretation of the
Self-Incrimination Clause).

45

46

See Muniz, 496 U.S. at 589 (quotation and citation omitted).

47

Id.

48

425 U.S. 391 (1976).
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by other commentators.49 That said, much can be gleaned from the decision itself.
The ruling covered two cases involving the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).50 In each
instance, IRS agents interviewed taxpayers for the possibility of civil or criminal
liability.51 Numerous facts were uncovered during the interview.52 Following the
interview, both taxpayers retrieved certain documents from their respective
accountants.53 They also sent those documents to their respective lawyers.54 The
IRS learned of the location of these documents and served summonses on the
attorneys to produce the documents. 55 Among other arguments, the taxpayers
claimed compelled production of their tax documents violated their Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.56
In Fisher, the Court made several important pronouncements. First, the
majority flatly rejected part of the near-century-old case, Boyd v. United States. 57
Namely, the Fisher Court rejected the Boyd view of a tangled Fourth and Fifth
Amendment.58 Writing for the Fisher majority, Justice White announced that the
See Cowen, supra note 9, at 866–69; Nagareda, supra note 25, at 1590–99; Gordon Hwang,
Fisher v. United States: Compelled Waiver of Foreign Bank Secrecy and the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, 56 Fordham L. Rev. 453, 456–63 (1987); Note, The Rights of Criminal Defendants
and the Subpoena Duces Tecum: The Aftermath of Fisher v. United States, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 683, 684–
85 (1982) [hereinafter Aftermath of Fisher].

49

50

See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 393–94.

51

Id.

Id. (“Shortly after the interviews . . . the taxpayers obtained from their respective accountants
certain documents relating to the preparation by the accountants of their tax returns.”).

52

53

Id.

54

Id.

Id. (“Upon learning of the whereabouts of the documents, the Internal Revenue Service
served summonses on the attorneys directed them to produce documents listed therein.”).

55

Id. at 395 (“[T]he attorney claimed that enforcement [of the summonses] would involve
compulsory self-incrimination of the taxpayers in violation of their Fifth Amendment
privilege[.]”).

56

Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 638 (1886) (holding that government searches and seizures
of private documents are violative of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments). But see Nagareda, supra
note 25, at 1607, 1623 (suggesting the modern Court has rejected the Boyd majority holding that
tangles the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, but largely misses that Justice Miller’s concurrence is
the correct reading of the Fifth Amendment).

57

See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 408–09 (“It would appear that under that case the precise claim
sustained in Boyd would now be rejected for reasons not there considered. The pronouncement in
Boyd that a person may not be forced to produce his private papers has nonetheless often appeared
as dictum in later opinions of this Court. To the extent, however, that the rule against compelling
production of private papers rested on the proposition that seizures of or subpoenas for ‘mere

58
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“foundations for the rule have been washed away.” 59 Justice White quipped, “In
consequence, the prohibition against forcing the production of private papers has
long been a rule searching for a rationale consistent with the proscriptions of the
Fifth Amendment.”60 Rejecting that blanket protection to all private papers, Justice
White paused to consider if there was testimony implicit in the act of producing
documents.61 Producing documents in compliance with a subpoena, as it turned
out, conceded the existence, possession, and control of the documents.62 Justice
White then stated that determining whether the “tacit averments” were testimonial
and incriminating rested on a case-by-case analysis.63
Recognizing that not all document production was protected, Justice White
created an exception allowing the government to compel production of personal
documents. 64 The rationale was that “the existence and locations of the papers
[were] a foregone conclusion and the [defendant’s physical act] adds little or nothing
to the sum total of the Government’s information by conceding that he in fact has
the papers.”65 And so, “no constitutional rights [were] touched. The question [wa]s
not of testimony but of surrender.”66
Those few lines mentioning foregone conclusions have taken on a life of their
own. The exception has continued to allow government compulsion of otherwise
testimonial documents.67 While receiving little attention in subsequent Supreme
evidence,’ including documents, violated the Fourth Amendment and therefore also transgressed
the Fifth, the foundations for the rule have been washed away.” (citations omitted)); see also infra
Part II.A.
59

Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409.

60

Id.

Id. (“Accordingly, we turn to the question of what, if any, incriminating testimony within the
Fifth Amendment’s protection, is compelled by a documentary summons.”).

61

Id. at 410 (“Compliance with the subpoena tacitly concedes the existence of the papers
demanded and their possession or control by the taxpayer. It also would indicate the taxpayer’s
belief that the papers are those described in the subpoena.”).

62

Id. (“These questions perhaps do not lend themselves to categorical answers; their resolution
may instead depend on the facts and circumstances of particular cases or classes thereof.”).

63

Id. at 411 (“The existence and location of the papers are a foregone conclusion and the taxpayer
adds little or nothing to the sum total of the Government’s information by conceding that he in
fact has the papers. Under these circumstances by enforcement of the summons ‘no constitutional
rights are touched. The question is not of testimony but of surrender.’” (citing In re Harris, 221
U.S. 274, 279 (1911))).

64

65

Id.

66

Id. (quotation and citation omitted).

67

See infra Part I.B.
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Court cases, the foregone conclusion doctrine has been expanded, albeit
inconsistently, among the lower courts.68 As one circuit judge put it, district courts
must use their discretion to determine the “imaginary line” or the level of
prosecutorial knowledge required for information to be a foregone conclusion.69 In
the next Section, I will review the subsequent treatment of the foregone conclusion
language, as well as its implication in the lower courts.
B. The Foregone Conclusion Doctrine
Following the Fisher rule on the foregone conclusion exception, its use and
further clarification have curiously been avoided at the Supreme Court.70 In United
States v. Doe, the Court briefly mentioned that the government could have argued for
the foregone conclusion exception but did not meet its burden. 71 On one later
occasion, the Court dismissively commented on the doctrine, stating, “Whatever
the scope of this ‘foregone conclusion’ rationale, the facts of this case plainly fall
outside of it.”72 Needless to say, this does not shed much light on the standing of the
exception. Perhaps parsing the language of the Fisher majority can explain the
limits—or expansiveness—of the doctrine.
Recall Fisher, in which the defendant-taxpayers had given their documents to
Zara S. Mason, Decoding the “Testimonial” Tug of War: When a Cellphone Search Warrant and a
Showing of Substantial Need and Undue Hardship Justify Cellphone Passcode Compulsion, 18 Wyo. L. Rev.
503, 506–07 (2018) (“There is currently no overarching federal guidance on this issue. As it stands,
numerous definitions of ‘testimonial’ are circulating throughout state case law, giving state courts
the ability to select whatever definition they want in order to fashion the desired result. The ability
to pick and choose from this collection of definitions is effectively resulting in the disclosure of
cellphone passcodes being categorized as a testimonial communication in some jurisdictions and
a nontestimonial communication in others.”).

68

United States v. Hubbell, 167 F.3d 552, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Williams, J., dissenting)
(“Somewhere in that range is an imaginary line which, unlike the equator, can never be fixed or
defined with clarity. Henceforth, therefore, the operational meaning of the ‘act of production’
doctrine in our circuit will largely turn on district courts’ discretion in this metaphysical
classification of prosecutors’ knowledge.”).

69

William F. Bloomer, 18th Century Constitutional Principles Meet 21st Century Technology:
Compelling Individuals to Enter Passwords Into Electronic Devices Under Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt, 468
Mass. 512 (2014) and Commonwealth v. Jones, 481 Mass. 540 (2019), 101 Mass. L. Rev. 65, 68–70
(2020) (reviewing the “murky genesis” of the foregone conclusion exception propounded in Fisher).

70

United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 614 n.13 (1984) (“This is not to say that the Government was
foreclosed from rebutting respondent’s claim by producing evidence that possession, existence,
and authentication were a ‘foregone conclusion.’ In this case, however, the Government failed to
make such a showing.”).

71

72

United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 44 (2000).
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their accountants. In compelling production of those documents, the government
relied on an independent source—the accountants—to retrieve the evidence.73 This
independent source persuaded the majority that the implied testimony in the
defendant’s act was a foregone conclusion.74 After all, the government knew that a
third party had prepared the documents.75 Thus, by conceding that the defendant
had the papers, the defendant’s actions “add[ed] little or nothing to the sum total of
the government’s information.”76 The majority distinguished this case from private
papers, figuring that since the accountant prepared the documents, the defendant
could not even authenticate the evidence himself. 77 No matter what the implied
testimony was, the production of tax documents had no testimonial value to
authenticate or incriminate; only the accountant could do so.78 From this language,
it is unclear whether a third-party authenticating witness is necessary or sufficient
to meet the foregone conclusion exception. The questions do not stop there.
Expanding on his foregone conclusion creation, Justice White claimed that,
similar to a handwriting sample, the act in question was not “sufficiently
testimonial.”79 Treading carefully, he stated that “[a]t this juncture, we are quite
unprepared to hold that either the fact of existence of the papers or of their
possession by the [defendant] poses any realistic threat of incrimination to the
[defendant].” 80 According to that rationale, courts must evaluate the value or

73

Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411–13 (1976).

Id. at 412–13 (1976) (“As for the possibility that responding to the subpoena would authenticate
the workpapers, production would express nothing more than the tax payer’s belief that the
papers are those described in the subpoena. The taxpayer would be no more competent to
authenticate the accountant’s workpapers or reports by producing them than he would be to
authenticate them if testifying orally. The taxpayer did not prepare the papers and could not vouch
for their accuracy.”).

74

See id. at 414 (“Whether the Fifth Amendment would shield the taxpayer from producing his
own tax records in his possession is a question not involved here; for the papers demanded here
are not his ‘private papers.’”).

75

76

Id. at 411.

77

Id. at 413–14.

78

Id. at 409–10.

Id. at 411 (claiming that the Fifth Amendment privilege to submit handwriting exemplars has
been deemed to not be “sufficiently testimonial.”). But see id. at 429 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“This
Court’s treatment of handwriting exemplars is not supportive of its position. . . . It is because
handwriting exemplars are viewed as strictly nontestimonial, not because they are insufficiently
testimonial, that the Fifth Amendment does not protect against their compelled production.”
(citations omitted)).

79

80

Id. at 412 (White, J., majority opinion).
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significance of testimony. 81 If the testimony is deemed significant, then the
defendant’s act of production is protected. Conversely, if the testimony only
implicates existence or possession, perhaps courts would find it not incriminating
enough to warrant protection of the Fifth Amendment.
It is possible, of course, that the aforementioned language in the Fisher holding
was intentionally narrow. Some suggest that is the appropriate reading.82 In the
meantime, other courts have continued to use this foregone conclusion rationale
and extend it to other areas, including device decryption.83 For the most part, those
courts proceed with this rule: the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause
protects acts of production that are compelled, incriminating, and testimonial. If
the implied testimony, however, “adds little or nothing to the sum total of the
Government’s information,” then it is a foregone conclusion, and the government
may compel the act.84
Difficulties accompany this rule. First, a court must distinguish those physical
acts that are testimonial from those that are not. Furthermore, to determine
whether testimony is of little or no value, a court must first understand what, in
fact, is communicated by a physical act. More simply stated, producing documents
must say something. If a court determines that implied states are compelled and
incriminating, the court must then decide whether the foregone conclusion
Id. at 429 (Brennan, J., concurring) (criticizing the “insufficiently testimonial” inquiry as
misguided and unfaithful to precedent).

81

Seo v. State, 148 N.E.3d 952, 955 (Ind. 2020) (“[A]nd this case also highlights concerns with
extending the limited exception to this context.”); Commonwealth v. Davis, 220 A.3d 534, 549
(Pa. 2019) (“Based upon the United States Supreme Court’s jurisprudence surveyed above, it
becomes evident that the foregone conclusion gloss on a Fifth Amendment analysis constitutes an
extremely limited exception to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. . . .
Indeed, it would be a significant expansion of the foregone conclusion rationale to apply it to a
defendant’s compelled oral or written testimony.”); Garcia v. State, 302 So.3d 1051, 1057 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App.2020) (declining to extend the foregone conclusion rationale beyond Fisher); see also
Cowen, supra note 9, at 877 (“With regard to Fisher’s ‘foregone conclusion’ doctrine, . . . the
Hubbell Court merely stood by the narrow holding in Fisher.”).

82

See, e.g., United States v. Apple MacPro Computer, 851 F.3d 238, 249 (3d Cir. 2017) (allowing
the government to compel decryption); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25,
2011, 670 F.3d 1335, 1352 (11th Cir. 2012) (denying compelled decryption); State v. Andrews, 234 A.3d
1254, 1277 (N.J. 2020) (agreeing with jurisdictions that allow compelled decryption); Seo, 148
N.E.3d at 955 (rejecting application of foregone conclusion exception, not allowing for compelled
decryption); Davis, 220 A.3d at 551 (denying government’s motion to compel decryption);
Commonwealth v. Jones, 117 N.E.3d 702, 707 (Mass. 2019) (allowing decryption on state
constitutional law grounds).

83

84

See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411; infra Part II.A.
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exception should apply.
Continuing through the Fisher maze, one must discern whether implied
testimony is “sufficiently testimonial” to warrant the protection of the Fifth
Amendment. On top of all that, a court must parse scant case law to fill in the other
gaps left by Fisher. For instance, what is the breadth of the foregone conclusion
doctrine? What must the government know? What is the government’s burden or
to what degree of certainty must they have independent knowledge? In the next
Part, I will briefly summarize the debate in academia. I will then highlight two cases
illustrating the results of this puzzling doctrine. Finally, I will review a potentially
drastic solution, adopted by two sitting Justices on the Supreme Court of the United
States.
II.

COMMENTATORS, LOWER COURTS, AND SPECULATORS

In the decades following Fisher, scholars and lower courts grappled with the
foregone conclusion doctrine.85 Zooming out from this arguably narrow exception
to the act of production doctrine, there have been much broader and more
consequential debates about revisiting Fifth Amendment jurisprudence.86 Justices
Thomas and Gorsuch have both suggested a willingness to revisit the
Self-Incrimination Clause altogether. 87 If the Court rids Fifth Amendment
jurisprudence of the testimonial versus non-testimonial distinction then the act of
production doctrine would not survive in its current form.88 Before reaching the
Justices’ arguments, I will review the work of commentators and lower courts that
advance (or limit) the foregone conclusion doctrine.
A. Foregone Conclusions and Compelled Decryption: Academic Disagreement
The expansion of the foregone conclusion doctrine has been met with much
debate. Important questions remain about what, in fact, the holding in Fisher even
means and if the holding applies to the increasingly prevalent area of
password-protected devices. 89 Commentators have argued several different
85

See infra Part II.A.

86

See infra Part II.C.

Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2271 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (discussing
his willingness to reconsider the Fifth Amendment); United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 49–55
(2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting); see infra Part II.C.

87

See Nagareda, supra note 25, at 1640 (“The implications for document subpoenas are clear
enough: The act-of-production doctrine announced in Fisher would be added to the list of widely
discarded constitutional doctrines”).

88

89

See generally Bloomer, supra note 68.
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understandings. Recent discussion has centered around an article by Professor
Orin S. Kerr in Texas Law Review. 90 Subsequent commentary on his piece offers
further questions, clarifications, and disagreement.91
In his article, Professor Kerr explained the difficulties associated with the act of
production doctrine and device decryption.92 As he put it, the act of production
doctrine is meant to protect implied testimony communicated by certain acts.93 On
the other hand, he continued, the foregone conclusion exception exists to prevent
suspects from erecting meaningless barriers solely to gain Fifth Amendment
protection. 94 Helpfully, then, Kerr highlighted a key distinction in the act of
production inquiry: the underlying documents versus the device’s encryption.95 Or,
as Kerr quipped, the “treasure” and the “door-opening evidence,” respectively. 96
Whereas the “treasure” is of Fourth Amendment concern, the “door-opening
evidence,” in his view, is the only concern of the Fifth Amendment.97 Thus, “[w]hen
the testimony implicit in the door-opening is not in play, and is only an incidental
matter of form rather than substance, access to the treasure should not be blocked
by the Fifth Amendment privilege.”98 To receive Fifth Amendment protection, then,
the implied testimony must be at issue.

90

See Kerr, supra note 42.

91

See Sacharoff, supra note 30; see also Choi, supra note 40.

See Kerr, supra note 42, at 768 (“The issue typically arises when investigators have a warrant
to search a cell phone or computer, but they cannot execute the search because the data is
encrypted. Investigators obtain a court order directing a suspect to produce a decrypted version
of the data by entering the password without disclosing it to the government. The suspect then
objects, claiming a Fifth Amendment privilege against complying with the order.”).

92

Id. at 776 (“The act of production doctrine is reasonably intuitive. It measures implicit
testimony in an act, relating to the Fifth Amendment’s core concern of compelled testimony.”).

93

Id. at 777 (“As I see it, the foregone conclusion doctrine exists to prevent suspects from
exploiting the act of production doctrine to create a bar to accessing nontestimonial evidence.”).

94

Id. (“This means that, when the government compels acts, it acquires two different kinds of
evidence at once. First, it learns the testimonial statements implicit in the act identified by the act
of production doctrine. Let’s call that ‘door-opening evidence.’ Second, the government also
obtains the nontestimonial evidence as a consequence of the act. Let’s call that ‘the treasure.’”).

95

Id. (“The act of compliance provides the government with two things. First, compliance
establishes the person’s testimonial door-opening evidence: the implicit beliefs about possession,
existence, and authenticity of the [sought] documents. Second, it provides access to the treasure,
the documents the government is seeking.”).

96

See id. (“The door-opening evidence is compelled testimony. But the treasure, what the
government finds in the documents, is not compelled testimony.”).

97

98

Id. at 778.
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Importantly, Kerr claimed the only implicit testimony of producing a passcode
is “I know the passcode.”99 Kerr then proposed a bright-line rule: If a defendant’s
knowledge of the passcode is at issue, then the government only needs independent
knowledge that a suspect knows the passcode to satisfy the foregone conclusion
exception.100 That is a seemingly low hurdle for the government to meet. In the
alternative, Kerr suggested the Supreme Court of the United States may have to
intervene and cease “apply[ing] constitutional doctrines mechanically to the new
facts of computers and the Internet.”101 Kerr pointed out that the Supreme Court
granted more Fourth Amendment protection to individuals’ historical cell-site
location records in Carpenter v. United States.102 In the cell phone encryption context,
however, Kerr suggested the Supreme Court might well do a “reverse-Carpenter.”103
In other words, since encryption technology now affords greater protection to
individuals, the government should have greater power to strike the “equilibrium,”
because individuals attempting to shield incriminating evidence from the
government now have an unfair advantage.104 Kerr believed that that over-reaching
result by the Supreme Court could be avoided, however, because his proposed
rule—enabling the government to compel passcodes when the door-opening
evidence is not at issue—would serve as a “safety valve” within the current
doctrine.105
Kerr’s rule highlighted the distinction between the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments in the device decryption context. Whereas Fourth Amendment
“[m]ethods of evidence collection hinge on technological change[,]” he continued,
“[t]he Fifth Amendment focuses on the gathering of information from a person’s
Id. at 779 (“Importantly, ‘I know the password’ is the only assertion implicit in unlocking the
device.”).

99

Id. at 778 (“When the testimony implicit in the door-opening is not in play, and is only an
incidental matter of form rather than substance, access to the treasure should not be blocked by
the Fifth Amendment privilege.”).

100

Id. at 790–97 (discussing the potential for the Supreme Court to change course and alter the
balance between individuals and the government based on technological advances).

101

138 S.Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018); see Kerr supra note 42, at 791–92 (discussing the Supreme Court’s
holding was due to “seismic shifts in digital technology” creating an imbalance between the
government and individuals).

102

See Kerr, supra note 42, at 792 (“Should Carpenter-like arguments about equilibriumadjustment extend to the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination? I’m not sure.”).

103

104

Id.

Id. at 798 (“Adoption of the Fifth Amendment standard proposed in this Essay can act as a
safety valve that lessens the pressure to enact heavy-handed legislative solutions. If my analysis is
right, governments already have considerable powers to get into encrypted devices.”).

105
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mind, not on the technological world in which he lives.”106 Unsurprisingly, then, he
viewed the reasonable particularity proposals by some scholars and courts as
“unilluminating” and misguided. 107 In his view, “there is a sense in which the
government does need to particularly describe the evidence sought—but for the
Fourth Amendment, not the Fifth Amendment.” 108 Therefore, if the government
already knows that the suspect possesses knowledge of the passcode, the Fifth
Amendment does not bar compulsion of the passcode.
Many have critiqued or advanced Kerr’s argument. Professor Laurent
Sacharoff commented that when considered in light of the precedent, Kerr’s rule is
incorrect.109 Instead, Sacharoff proposed a rule that Kerr criticized: the government
must already know the person possesses the files on the device and be able to identify
the files with reasonable particularity. 110 To meet the foregone conclusion
exception, according to Sacharoff, the government must know precisely the
existence of the underlying documentary evidence that they seek, where it is, and
that it is authentic. 111 Following Sacharoff’s reasoning, unless the government
knows the contents of the documents they are searching for—before obtaining
them—then the government must produce the key, the lockpick, the bulldozer, the
battering ram, or the 64-character code. It should be clear that whether the
foregone conclusion doctrine applies to the files (as Sacharoff argues) or only the

Id. at 792 (arguing against a Carpenter-like adjustment to the Fifth Amendment, Kerr
emphasized evidence collection as a Fourth Amendment issue that needs to change with
technology, whereas the Fifth Amendment is only concerned with the compulsion aspect); see also
Aftermath of Fisher, supra note 49, at 683 (“Lower courts must recognize that Fisher v. United States
and other recent Supreme Court decisions represent a fundamental shift in fifth amendment
jurisprudence from a concern with privacy to a focus on compulsion.”).

106

Kerr, supra note 42, at 775 (“Whatever the merits of the ‘reasonable particularity’ standard in
the specific context of subpoenaed documents, the test is notably unilluminating as to the
government’s burden outside that context.”).

107

108

Id. at 787.

See Sacharoff, supra note 42, at 63 (“But when we consider the analogy to the act-ofproduction cases closely, and match like to like, we really should arrive at a rule different from
Kerr’s.”).

109

Id. at 63–64 (“Rather, the rule should be whether the government already knows the person
possesses the files on the device and can identify them with reasonable particularity.”). But see
Kerr, supra note 42, at 786–87 (criticizing the Eleventh Circuit’s reasonable particularity approach
as unclear and, if read that way, the analysis as incorrect).

110

111

Sacharoff, supra note 42, at 63–64.
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password (as Kerr sees it) is outcome determinative.112
Admittedly, this doctrine has become increasingly confusing. Not only must
jurists determine whether the act is testimonial, but they must then interpret what
the testimony is saying to determine whether it is at issue. This task is “nearly
impossible.”113 Kerr believes this to be “I know the passcode.”114 As Sacharoff points
out, Kerr’s understanding “violates the ordinary principles of evidence law, which
draws no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence.”115 Sacharoff sees
production of the passcode as testifying “I know the password, this is, then, likely
my device, and thus I likely have control over and knowledge of the contents on the
device.”116 In a separate response to Kerr’s article, Professor Bryan H. Choi suggests
a novel idea: “treating cellphones as an extension of ‘self,’” potentially creating an
entire area not subject to government compulsion.117
Much hinges on the judicial determinations about whether the entire device or
only the passcode receive the protection. Imagine that a government search
warrant is executed for a cell phone. In the device decryption context, the warrant
has already given the government the power to take and search the device.118 The
government may even lawfully possess the device. The only thing left to be produced
is the passcode. And so, is this act of compelling decryption simply handing over
the passcode, as Kerr suggests, or is there more implicit testimony that deserves
protection, as Sacharoff argues?

See Sacharoff, supra note 42, at 67 (“If the only message communicated is knowledge of the
password, then Kerr is right: the government need only show the person knows the password. If,
however, the act of opening the device also communicates that the person likely owns the device
and the files on it, then the government must show that it already knows of and can identify with
reasonable particularity the actual files it seeks, or at least a class of files such as bank records for
a particular account—a higher burden.”).

112

Id. (“[C]ourts must perform a nearly impossible task: determine what message the act of
production or the entering of a password, implicitly communicates without the normal or
principled way to measure what a message means—speaker intent.”).

113

See Kerr, supra note 42, at 779 (“Entering a password is testimonial because it communicates
a simple statement: ‘I know the password.’”).

114

115

See Sacharoff, supra note 42, at 69–70.

Id. at 70 (“If a person opens a device, we can infer she owns it, whether we denominate that
act direct or circumstantial evidence.”).

116

See Choi, supra note 40, at 74 (“The theory advanced here is that those judicial decisions are
best understood as treating cellphones as an extension of ‘self.’”).

117

See Kerr, supra note 42, at 787 (“Most compelled decryption helps the government execute a
search warrant. The Fourth Amendment requires the warrant to particularly describe the
evidence to be searched for and seized.”).

118
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This act of production analog—from document production to passcode
production—is far from perfect. Certainly, if the government compelled the
defendant to physically hand over the passcode, it would seem similar to a suspect
physically handing over documents. But what does one make of the passcode?
There is simply no clean-cut way to compare paper documents to the contents of an
electronic device. In addition, when considering the complex encryption software
that exists to protect device data, a passcode does not seem akin to a lock or a safe.
As one can see, expanding this rationale to the device decryption context is
troubling and delicate, but incredibly consequential. Unfortunately, many conflate
the doctrine and entangle the Fourth and Fifth Amendment.119 This entanglement
directly conflicts with the scholarship on the foregone conclusion doctrine. The
extent to which the Fisher Court explicitly wanted to avoid this cannot be
overstated.120
Similar to scholarly debate, lower court decisions have not proven to be much
more insightful. As I will discuss, New Jersey and Pennsylvania interpret the
doctrine differently in an increasingly important area.121 They are not alone.122 The
But even those who criticize the approach taken by Sacharoff and others, admit that focusing
solely on the passcode is hard to do in practice. See Nagareda, supra note 25, at 1594 (emphasizing
that the decoupling of documents from the act of producing those documents is a “fundamental
folly” of Fisher).

119

See Michael S. Pardo, Disentangling the Fourth and Fifth Amendment and the Self-Incrimination
Clause, 90 Iowa L. Rev. 1857, 1875 (2005) (“Subsequent doctrinal developments have torpedoed
Boyd’s view of the overlap.”); see also Akhil R. Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv. L.
Rev. 757, 790 (1994) (“Boyd’s effort to fuse the Fourth and Fifth Amendments has not stood the test
of time and has been plainly rejected by the modern Court. Boyd’s mistake was not in its focus on
the concept of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness, nor in its laudable effort to read the Fourth
Amendment Reasonableness Clause in light of other constitutional provisions. . . . Rather, Boyd’s
mistake was to misread both the Reasonableness Clause and the Incrimination Clause by trying
to fuse them together. At heart, the two provisions are motivated by very different ideas; they do
not ‘run almost into each other’ as a general matter.”); Nagareda, supra note 25, at 1580–81
(discussing the rejection of the Boyd majority’s fusion of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, but
adopting Justice Miller’s view of the Fifth Amendment in concurrence).

120

121

See infra Part II.B.

Compare State v. Stahl, 206 So.3d 124, 132–33 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (citing a string of cases
where courts “have addressed the Fifth Amendment implications for providing decryption keys
and passcodes have largely applied the act-of-production doctrine and the foregone conclusion
exception.”), with G.A.Q.L. v. State, 257 So.3d 1058, 1062–63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018) (holding that
the foregone conclusion exception applies, but then applying the reasonable particularity
requirement to the underlying documents); see also Jesse Coulon, Comment, Privacy, Screened Out:
Analyzing the Threat to Individual Privacy Rights and Fifth Amendment Protections in State v. Stahl, 59
B.C. L. Rev. E-Supplement 225 (2018). But see G.A.Q.L., 257 So. 3d at 1066 (Kuntz, J. concurring)

122
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current doctrine cannot be the right way. If we continue making courts complete
this impossible task, then why not just make it up? What is the best path forward?
In the next section, I use two recent cases to illustrate how the courts handle this
difficult doctrine.
B. Recent Debate and Disagreement: Davis and Andrews
Courts across the country have struggled with the interpretation of the forgone
conclusion doctrine. Some courts have strictly limited the holding of Fisher to
document production.123 Others have expanded the foregone conclusion analysis
into other areas.124 The courts opting to apply the foregone conclusion doctrine have
mixed-and-matched the different approaches.125 As one scholar put it, the doctrine
remains “surprisingly unclear.” 126 To illustrate the current state of affairs in the
lower courts, I will analyze two recent conflicting cases from the Supreme Courts of
Pennsylvania and New Jersey.
1.

Commonwealth v. Davis

In Commonwealth v. Davis, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had to answer
“[w]hether a defendant may be compelled to disclose a password to allow the
(disagreeing with the Stahl decision because the exception is “judicially created,” not found within
the text of the Fifth Amendment, and is of limited applicability since the exception has never
applied to oral testimony).
See Commonwealth v. Davis, 220 A.3d 534, 549 (Pa. 2019) (discussing the different approaches
by the Davis lower courts); G.A.Q.L., 257 So.3d at 1061 (collecting cases).

123

See State v. Andrews, 234 A.3d 1254,, 1259 (N.J. 2020) (applying the foregone conclusion
doctrine to cell phone decryption); see also United States v. Apple MacPro Computer, 851 F.3d 238,
248 (3d Cir. 2017) (upholding a lower court’s determination that the foregone conclusion doctrine
applies to files on several devices). But see In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March
25, 2011, 670 F.3d 1335, 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2012) (applying the foregone conclusion exception, but
requiring the Government show with “reasonable particularity” that it knew of the underlying
materials).

124

In Commonwealth v. Davis, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania discusses the procedural
history of the case. Notably, the trial court applied the foregone conclusion doctrine, yet still
required the government to establish knowledge of (1) the existence of the evidence demanded; (2)
the possession or control of the evidence by the defendant; and (3) the authenticity of the evidence.
While upholding the trial court decision, the three-judge panel of the Superior Court focused on
the passcode rather than the underlying evidence. Finally, in its alternative holding, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania believed the inquiry focused on the underlying evidence, but then held the
government had not met its burden. Davis, 220 A.3d at 539–40, 551–52.

125

See Kerr, supra note 42, at 774 (“Three aspects of the foregone conclusion doctrine remain
surprisingly unclear.”).

126
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[government] access to the defendant’s lawfully-seized, but encrypted,
computer.”127 Writing for the majority, Justice Todd held such compulsion violated
the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause. 128 Because the Fisher Court
suggested that the facts of each case are important, a brief recitation of the facts in
Davis is warranted.129
In 2014, agents from the Pennsylvania Office of the Attorney General (OAG)
discovered an Internet Protocol (IP) address using a file-sharing network, eMule.130
The agents used an administrative subpoena to intercept child pornography sent to
the IP address. 131 Agents determined the IP address belonged to the defendant,
Joseph Davis.132 The Government obtained a lawful warrant and seized Davis’s Dell
computer.133 The hard drive had been wiped.134 Shortly thereafter Davis’s IP address
came up again during another investigation. 135 The OAG agents performed this
process again and, unsurprisingly, discovered another computer.136
After being Mirandized, Davis told agents he was the “sole user” of the
password-protected computer. 137 Davis told the officers only he knew the
127

Davis, 220 A.2d at 537.

Id. (For the reasons that follow, we find that such compulsion is violative of the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution’s prohibition against self-incrimination. Thus, we
reverse the order of the Superior Court.”).

128

Id.; see also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976) (“These questions perhaps do not
lend themselves to categorical answers; their resolution may instead depend on the facts and
circumstances of particular cases or classes thereof.”).

129

130

Davis, 220 A.3d at 538.

Id. at 537 (“Specifically, agents used a computer with software designed to make a one-to-one
connection with the computer at the aforementioned IP address and downloaded a file, later
confirmed to contain child pornography, which was saved to the OAG computer.”).

131

Id. (“The information provided by Comcast disclosed the subscriber as Appellant Joseph
Davis, as well as his address.”).

132

Id. (“[T]he OAG applied for, received, and executed a search warrant at Appellant’s
apartment.”).

133

Id. at 538 (“Later examination of the computer revealed that the hard drive had been ‘wiped,’
removing data entirely or rendering it unreadable.”).

134

135

Id.

Id. (“[T]he OAG executed another search warrant at Appellant’s apartment based upon this
video. At Appellant’s apartment, the agents discovered a single computer, an HP Envy 700
desktop.”).

136

Id. (“Appellant informed the agents that he lived alone, that he was the sole user of the
computer, and that he used hardwired Internet services which are password protected, and, thus,
not accessible by the public, such as through Wifi.”).

137
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password.138 He claimed to watch legal pornography on the computer, that he had
been arrested previously for child pornography, and did not understand why it was
illegal in the United States. 139 En route to his arraignment, Davis spoke about
watching pornographic movies containing minors. 140 After agents asked for the
computer password, Davis responded, “It’s 64 characters and why would I give that
to you? We both know what’s on there. It’s only going to hurt me.”141 Davis made
other statements acknowledging the incriminating nature of the documents on the
computer.142 As it turned out, the computer hard drive was completely encrypted
and could not be read without opening it.143
Considering the Government’s motion to compel Davis to divulge his password,
the trial court applied the foregone conclusion exception.144 The trial court found
the government needed to “establish its knowledge of (1) the existence of the
evidence demanded; (2) the possession or control of the evidence by the defendant;
and (3) the authenticity of the evidence.”145 It is worth noting that the trial court
focused on the government’s knowledge of the pornographic files rather than the
passcode.146 Davis, by “revealing his password,” the trial court found, “would not

138

Id. (“Appellant offered that only he knew the password to his computer.”).

Id. (“Appellant also informed the agents, inter alia, that he watched pornography on the
computer which he believed was legal; that he had previously been arrested for child pornography;
and that child pornography was legal in other countries so he did not understand why it was illegal
in the United States.”).

139

Id. (“Subsequently, when in transit to his arraignment, Appellant spoke openly about
watching various pornographic movies, indicating that he particularly liked watching 10, 11, 12,
and 13-year olds.”).

140

141

Id.

142

Id.

Id. (“A supervisory agent in computer forensics . . . testified that a portion of Appellant’s
[computer] hard drive was encrypted . . . and ‘there was no data that could be read without
opening the TrueCrypt volume.’”).

143

Id. at 539 (“As part of its analysis, the trial court looked to the ‘foregone conclusion’ exception
to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination as articulated by the United States
Supreme Court in Fisher.”).

144

145

Id.

Id. (“[T]he trial court determined that the information the Commonwealth sought from
Appellant was a foregone conclusion, in that the facts to be conveyed by Appellant’s act of
production of his password already were known to the government. As, according to the trial court,
Appellant’s revealing his password would not provide the Commonwealth with any new evidence,
and would simply be an act that permitted the Commonwealth to retrieve what was already known
to them, the foregone conclusion exception was satisfied.” (emphasis added)).
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provide the Commonwealth with any new evidence, and would simply be an act that
permitted the Commonwealth to retrieve what was already known to them . . . .”147
Thus, the trial court believed that the foregone conclusion exception was satisfied
and the government could compel the production.148 Notably, the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania upheld the trial court order, but on slightly different grounds.149 The
Superior Court centered their inquiry on the passcode itself.150
Beginning with the Fifth Amendment, a four-justice majority of the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania acknowledged the “series of foundational, but somewhat
complex” cases discussing the act of production.151 In reaching her decision, Justice
Todd mentioned a “critical distinction” regarding physical versus testimonial
production. 152 This rested on some questionable dicta in Doe v. United States
(Doe II).153
Justice Todd was persuaded by the “critical distinction,” drawn briefly in a
controversial footnote, which referred to a surrendered key to a strongbox versus
compelled combination to a wall safe.154 By Todd’s logic, this meant that since “a
147

Id.

148

Id.

Id. at 540 (“Applying the foregone conclusion exception, the Superior Court, contrary to the
trial court, focused on the password itself, and reasoned that the Commonwealth established the
computer could not be opened without the password, that the computer belonged to Appellant
and the password was in his possession, and that this information was ‘self-authenticating’ – i.e.,
if the computer was accessible upon entry of the password, the password was authentic.”).

149

150

Id.

Id. at 543, 552 (“In a series of foundational, but somewhat complex, cases, however, the high
Court has discussed whether the act of production of documents may be testimonial for purposes
of the Fifth Amendment.”).

151

Id. at 547 (“Finally, and consistent with this historical repulsion of the prospect of compelling
a defendant to reveal his or her mental impressions, we find it particularly revealing that, when
addressing Justice Stevens’s dissent in Doe II, the majority of the Court noted that compelling the
defendant to sign the bank disclosure forms was more akin to ‘be[ing] forced to surrender a key
to a strongbox containing incriminating documents’ than it was to ‘be[ing] compelled to reveal the
combination to [petitioner’s] wall safe.’” (alterations in original) (citation omitted)).

152

Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 n.9 (1988). The Doe II Court wrestled with the issue of
compelling an individual to sign a consent directive for a third party to release potentially
incriminating documents, but allowed it. In response to a dissenting Justice Stevens, the Doe
majority indisputably stated that “‘[t]he expression of the contents of an individual’s mind’ is
testimonial communication for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment.” Id.

153

Davis, 220 A.3d at 547, 555 n.3. It should be noted that reliance on this line has been criticized
by several commentators and other courts. See Kerr, supra note 42, at 782 (“In my view, Doe II’s
dicta sheds no light either way on the Fifth Amendment implications of being forced to enter a
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passcode is necessarily memorized, one cannot reveal a passcode without revealing
the contents of one’s mind.”155 Because a passcode is “intentionally personalized”
and “so unique as to accomplish its intended purpose—keeping information
contained therein confidential and insulated from discovery,” it is testimonial.156 It
followed that the government sought the password “not as an end, but as a pathway
to the files being withheld.”157
Recall, however, that finding an act is testimonial does not necessarily warrant
Fifth Amendment protection. Todd acknowledged as much.158 While giving a nod
to the foregone conclusion exception, the Davis majority called it “extremely
limited.” 159 Not ending there, Todd continued, “[I]t would be a significant
expansion of the foregone conclusion rationale to apply it to a defendant’s
compelled oral or written testimony.” 160 Relying in part on the Fisher Court’s
ambiguous discussion and its “intentional[] superfl[uity],” Todd put an end to any
hopes of expanding the foregone conclusion rationale.161 Others disagree, including
in Pennsylvania.
Illustrative of the fragility of this analysis, the Davis court was divided four
justices to three.162 Writing for the three-justice dissent, Justice Baer characterized

password. Both statements in the dicta are truisms.”). See Davis, 220 A.3d at 555, 555 n.3 (Baer,
J., dissenting) (rejecting the applicability of the wall safe versus key distinction, Justice Baer states,
“The mere fact that Appellant is required to think in order to complete the act of production, in
my view, does not immunize that act of production from the foregone conclusion rationale.”); see
also State v. Stahl, 206 So. 3d 124, 134 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (“We question whether identifying
the key which will open the strongbox—such that the key is surrendered—is, in fact, distinct from
telling an officer the combination. More importantly, we question the continuing viability of any
distinction as technology advances.”).
155

Davis, 220 A.3d at 548 (Todd, J., majority opinion).

156

Id.

Id. (“The Commonwealth is seeking the password, not as an end, but as a pathway to the files
being withheld.”).

157

Id. (“This, however, does not end our analysis. As noted above, the United States Supreme
Court has found information, otherwise testimonial in nature, to be unprotected where the
production of such information is a foregone conclusion.”).

158

Id. at 549 (“Based upon the United States Supreme Court’s jurisprudence surveyed above, it
becomes evident that the foregone conclusion gloss on a Fifth Amendment analysis constitutes an
extremely limited exception to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.”).

159

160

Id.

Id. (“Thus, generally speaking, the exception to a large degree appears to be intentionally
superfluous; hence, the accommodation to the government is of limited value.”).

161

162

Id. at 552 (Baer, J., dissenting).
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the testimony implicit in the act of production much differently.163 Baer viewed the
implied statements of the produced passcode to include existence, possession, and
authenticity of the passcode. 164 Rather than use the passcode “as an investigative
tool,” the dissent argued the government was simply seeking access to execute a valid
warrant.165 This, in the dissent’s view, became an order of surrender rather than
testimony.166
Turning to the foregone conclusion doctrine, Baer directly addressed the appeal
of the majority’s conclusion. 167 Whether it be disclosing a passcode or business
records, “one would expend similar mental effort when engaging in virtually any
other act of production. . . .” 168 Unconvinced by the majority’s sweeping
pronouncement, Justice Baer cleverly responded, “The mere fact that [defendant] is
required to think in order to complete the act of production, in my view, does not
immunize that act of production from the foregone conclusion rationale.”169 It is no
surprise, then, that Justice Baer applied the foregone conclusion exception.170
Id. at 553 (“I would hold that the foregone conclusion analysis applies to the compelled
disclosure of a password to an electronic device, which the Commonwealth has seized pursuant
to a warrant.”).

163

Id. at 555 (“An order compelling disclosure of the password, here a 64-character password,
has testimonial attributes, not in the characters themselves, but in the conveyance of information
establishing that the password exists, that Appellant has possession and control of the password,
and that the password is authentic, as it will decrypt the encrypted computer files.”).

164

Id. (“The Commonwealth is not seeking the 64-character password as an investigative tool . .
. . To the contrary, the Commonwealth already possesses evidence of Appellant’s guilt, which it
set forth in an affidavit of probable cause to obtain a warrant to search Appellant’s computer.
Stated differently, the Commonwealth is not asking Appellant to ‘speak his guilt,’ but merely to
allow the government to execute a warrant that it lawfully obtained.”).

165

Id. (“Because I view the compulsion order as requiring the ‘surrender’ of Appellant’s password
to decrypt his computer files, I would apply Fisher’s act-of-production test.”).

166

Id. (“There is appeal to [the majority’s] conclusion, as requiring Appellant to supply his
password involves some mental effort in recalling the 64 characters used to encrypt the computer
files.” (alteration added)).

167

Id. (“However, one would expend similar mental effort when engaging in virtually any other
act of production, such as the disclosure of business or financial records, as the individual must
retrieve the contents of his mind to recall the documents’ location before disclosing them to the
government.”).

168

169

Id. (alteration added).

Id. at 556 (“Accordingly, I would align myself with those jurisdictions that examine the
requisites of the foregone conclusion exception by focusing only on the compelled evidence itself,
i.e., the computer password, and not the decrypted files that the password would ultimately
reveal.”) (citing United States v. Apple MacPro Comput., 851 F.3d 238, 248 n.7 (3d Cir. 2017)).
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In his analysis, Justice Baer first made clear that the exception focused on the
evidence sought. 171 This was the dissent’s critical distinction. 172 In the dissent’s
view, the evidence sought was solely the passcode, rather than the underlying
documents. 173 In keeping with Kerr’s “treasure” versus “key” distinction, Justice
Baer believed if the focal point were the underlying documents, that would be a
Fourth Amendment concern.174 On the other hand, the Fifth Amendment is only
concerned with incriminating, compelled evidence—here, the password.175
Justice Baer justified his view on several grounds. First, Baer believed the
dissent remained faithful to the Fisher holding.176 Second, the dissent sought and
received support from several cases from other jurisdictions that apply the foregone
conclusion to the password itself. 177 Finally, the dissent emphasized that the
majority’s holding was largely based on form rather than substance.178 The practical
effect would be “inconsistent results.”179 For instance, according to the majority’s

Id. (“[I]t is my position that the foregone conclusion exception as applied to the facts
presented relates not to the computer files, but to the password itself.”).

171

172

Id. (“This change of focus is subtle, but its effect is significant.”).

Id. (“Appellant’s computer files were not the subject of the compulsion order, which instead
involved only the password that would act to decrypt those files.”).

173

Id. (“This Court should not alleviate concerns over the potential overbreadth of a digital
search in violation of Fourth Amendment privacy concerns by invoking the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, which offers no privacy protection.”); see also Kerr, supra note
42, at 797.

174

Davis, 220 A.3d at 556 (“[T]he same is not dispositive of the instant claim based upon the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination, which focuses upon whether the evidence
compelled, here, the password, requires the defendant to provide incriminating, testimonial
evidence.”) (Baer, J., dissenting).

175

Id. (“This Court should not alleviate concerns over the potential overbreadth of a digital
search in violation of Fourth Amendment privacy concerns by invoking the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, which offers no privacy protection. The High Court in Fisher
made this point clear by stating, ‘We cannot cut the Fifth Amendment loose from the moorings of
its language, and make it serve as a general protector of privacy – a word not mentioned in its text
and a concept directly addressed in the Fourth Amendment.’”) (citing Fisher v. United States, 425
U.S. 391, 401 (1976) (emphasis in original)).

176

Id. at 556–57 (citing several cases holding that the foregone conclusion exception applies to
the passcode itself).

177

Id. at 557 (arguing that, under the majority’s rationale, multi-character passwords could not
be compelled, but biometric passwords could).

178

Id. (“Finally, it is my belief that the majority’s approach could render inconsistent results as
the determination of whether there was a Fifth Amendment violation in compelled decryption

179
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rationale, the government could compel a “biometric password, such as facial
recognition or a fingerprint,” but not entering a numerical passcode.180 Baer did not
view that as relevant to cases involving today’s technology.181
The commentators in the previous section all agreed that the compelled written
passcode was protected. 182 While that may be true in theory, in practice the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was closely and sharply divided on that question.183
Shortly after the Davis decision, the Supreme Court of New Jersey engaged with a
similar question.184 In State v. Andrews, the Supreme Court of New Jersey sided with
Justice Baer and the Davis dissent.185
2. State v. Andrews
Robert Andrews, a law enforcement officer, allegedly furnished the target of a
narcotics investigation, Quincy Lowery, with information to avoid criminal
liability.186 The incriminating information was distributed via photograph, phone
calls, text messages, and in-person conversations between Andrews and the
cases could depend upon the type of password that the individual employed to protect his
encrypted files.” (emphasis added)).
Id. (“For example, according to the majority, if the accused used a multi-character password
. . . and the government compelled the individual to supply the password, a Fifth Amendment
violation would result because the password manifests through the use of one’s mind . . . .
However, if the individual employed a biometric password, such as facial recognition or a
fingerprint, the majority’s analysis would arguably lose its force. Under those circumstances, the
individual is not using the contents of his mind but, rather, is performing a compelled act of
placing his finger or face in the appropriate position to decrypt the files.”).

180

181

Id.

See Sacharoff, supra note 42, at 68 (“[Kerr] treats the act as entering the password. . . . [I]f the
password were considered the thing produced, that would violate the Fifth Amendment because
then the government would be compelling the person to reveal the password from their head—
even Kerr concedes that we cannot compel the password itself from a person’s head.” (alteration
added)); see also Kerr, supra note 42, at 779 (referring carefully to the act as entering the password
rather than speaking or writing it to the government).

182

183

See generally Davis, 220 A.3d at 534.

State v. Andrews, 234 A.3d 1254, 1259 (N.J. 2020) (“This appeal presents an issue of first
impression to our Court – whether a court order requiring a criminal defendant to disclose the
passcodes to his passcode-protected cellphones violates the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. . . .”).

184

Id. at 1274 (“We agree with the Davis dissent that the proper focus here is on the Fifth
Amendment and that the Fourth Amendment’s privacy protections should not factor into analysis
of the Fifth Amendment’s applicability.”).

185

186

Id. at 1259.
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target. 187 The target gave extensive detail of this information to the State. 188
Following this admission, the State obtained warrants to arrest Andrews and search
his iPhones.189 The iPhones were encrypted and thus inaccessible to investigators.190
The State requested an order to compel the defendant to disclose the passcodes.191
Andrews opposed the motion.192
Writing for the majority, Justice Solomon briefly examined the Fourth
Amendment implications of the case.193 Careful to not entangle the Fourth and Fifth
Amendment, Solomon noted the State’s “broad authority to effectuate searches
permitted by valid search warrants.” 194 Other than the trial court’s limiting
instruction, there were no other limitations or restrictions imposed by the Fourth
Amendment.195 Nor did Andrews challenge the search warrants. 196 The majority
then turned to the Fifth Amendment.197
Similar to the Davis dissent, the Andrews majority began discussing the

187

Id. at 1260.

188

Id.

Id. at 1261 (“Following their second interview with Lowery, the State obtained
Communication Data Warrants for cellphone numbers belonging to Andrews and Lowery.”).

189

Id. (“According to the State, its Telephone Intelligence Unit was unable to search Andrews’s
iPhones – an iPhone 6 Plus and an iPhone 5s – because they had iOS systems greater [than] 8.1,
making them extremely difficult to access without the owner/subscriber’s pass code.” (alteration
in original) (quotation omitted)).

190

Id. (“The State therefore moved to compel Andrews to disclose the passcodes to his two
iPhones.”).

191

192

Id.

Id. at 1264 (“[B]ecause the State contends that [constitutional] protections do not allow
defendant to ignore a lawfully issued search warrant, we begin with a brief review of the applicable
principles of our search and seizure jurisprudence.” (alteration added)).

193

194

Id.

Id. (“Thus, the State is permitted to access the phones’ contents, as limited by the trial court’s
order, in the same way that the State may survey a home, vehicle, or other place that is subject of
a search warrant.”).

195

Id. (“Andrews does not challenge the search warrants issued for his cellphones. He does not
claim that the phones were unlawfully seized or that the search warrants authorizing the State to
comb their contents were unsupported by probable cause.”).

196

Id. (citing In re Search of a Residence in Oakland, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1010, 1014 (N.D. Cal. 2019);
Pardo, supra note 120, at 1860) (“But a lawful seizure does not allow compelled disclosure of facts
otherwise protected by the Fifth Amendment.”).

197
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testimonial versus non-testimonial distinction of physical acts.198 Justice Solomon
agreed that the Self-Incrimination Clause protects against compelled disclosure of
contents of the mind.199 Yet, he contrasted, the “Fifth Amendment is not an absolute
bar to a defendant’s forced assistance of the defendant’s own criminal
prosecution.” 200 After parsing several act of production cases, Justice Solomon
thought it clear that precedent required a sharp, but bright, distinction between the
act of producing a passcode, and the underlying documents.201
At one point, the Andrews majority squarely addressed the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court’s holding in Davis. The Andrews majority drew its own distinction.202
Justice Solomon thought it clear that the act of production doctrine protected solely
the passcode. 203 After all, Justice Solomon believed the U.S. Supreme Court’s
language clearly drew a “fundamental distinction.”204 As the Fisher Court stated, the
underlying documents may not be entitled to Fifth Amendment protection, “but the
act of producing them may nevertheless be protected.”205 Notably, this may well be

Id. at 1265 (“Testimonial communications may take any form, but must ‘imply assertions of
fact’ for the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to attach. Thus, actions that
do not require an individual ‘to disclose any knowledge he might have’ or ‘to speak his guilt’ are
nontestimonial and therefore not protected by the Fifth Amendment.”) (citations omitted).

198

Id. at 1266 (“In contrast to physical communications, however, if an individual is compelled
‘to disclose the contents of his own mind,’ such disclosure implicates the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination.”) (citations omitted).

199

200

Id.

Id. at 1268–69 (“From those cases, which all addressed the compelled production of
documents, the following principles can be inferred: For purposes of the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, the act of production must be considered in its own right,
separate from the documents sought.”).

201

Id. at 1271–73 (citing several cases where numerous jurisdictions have found the password to
be the target of the act of production inquiry).

202

Id. at 1273 (“To be consistent with the Supreme Court case law that gave rise to the exception,
we find that the foregone conclusion test applies to the production of the passcodes themselves,
rather than to the phones’ contents.”).

203

Id. at 1273–74 (“The relevant Supreme Court cases explicitly predicate the applicability of the
foregone conclusion doctrine on the fundamental distinction between the act of production and
the documents to be produced . . . . In light of the stark distinction the Court has drawn between
the evidentiary object and its production – a division reinforced even in those cases where the
foregone conclusion exception was held not to apply – it is problematic to meld the production of
passcodes with the act of producing the contents of the phones.”).

204

205

Id. at 1274 (citing Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976)).
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the view of the Third Circuit.206 This was the view of the three-justice dissent in
Davis.207 And this, Justice Solomon adopted as the law in the Supreme Court of New
Jersey.208
In addition, Solomon made an important observation regarding passcode
compulsion. Solomon emphasized, “[I]ndeed, had the State succeeded in its efforts
to access the phones, this case would not be before us.”209 That is, if the government
hacked the phone pursuant to a lawful warrant, or if there was no passcode on the
phone, there would be no Fifth Amendment violation. This means then, that the
contents of the cell phone simply cannot be the focus of the inquiry. For if there
were no passcode, there would be no Fifth Amendment concern for the underlying
documents. It follows that the passcode must be the target of the compulsion.
Therefore, the passcode is what deserves the protection, not the documents.
It bears repeating that the Andrews majority also mentioned the inconsistency
concerns of the Davis dissent regarding biometric device locks. Such holdings
“create[] inconsistent approaches based on form rather than substance.”210 After all,
Solomon noted, “in some cases, a biometric device lock can be established only after
a passcode is created.”211 It should be no surprise, then, that immediately thereafter,
the Andrews majority “call[ed] into question the testimonial/non-testimonial

United States v. Apple MacPro Comput., 851 F.3d 238, 248 n.7 (3d Cir. 2017) (“It is important
to note that we are not concluding that the Government’s knowledge of the content of the devices
is necessarily the correct focus of the ‘foregone conclusion’ inquiry in the context of a compelled
decryption order. Instead, a very sound argument can be made that the foregone conclusion
doctrine properly focuses on whether the Government already knows the testimony that is
implicit in the act of production. In this case, the fact known to the government that is implicit in
the act of providing the password for the devices is ‘I, John Doe, know the password for these
devices.’”).

206

Commonwealth v. Davis, 220 A.3d 534, 556 (Pa. 2019) (Baer, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is my position
that the foregone conclusion exception as applied to the facts presented relates not to the
computer files, but to the password itself.”).

207

Andrews, 234 A.3d at 1273 (“To be consistent with the Supreme Court case law that gave rise to
the exception, we find that the foregone conclusion test applies to the production of the passcodes
themselves, rather than to the phones’ contents.”).

208

209

Id.

210

Id. at 1274.

Id.; see also Kristen M. Jacobsen, Note, Game of Phones, Data Isn’t Coming: Modern Mobile
Operating System Encryption and Its Chilling Effect on Law Enforcement, 85 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 566,
582 (2017) (discussing further the troubling distinction between numeric passcodes and biometric
locks).
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distinction in this context.”212
By now, it should be clear that a court’s determination about the “focus” of the
foregone conclusion inquiry becomes outcome-determinative. If the exception
applies to only the passcode itself, it is easier for the government to meet the burden
of the foregone conclusion exception. If the government knows (1) the password
exists, (2) the suspect possesses it, and (3) it is authentic, the testimonial value is
“minimal.” Basically, if there is a password prompt on the device, the government
has information regarding the suspect’s use of the phone, and the password works,
then the password is a foregone conclusion.
Conversely, courts that deem the underlying documents as the “focus” of the
Fifth Amendment make it near impossible for government agents to access a
password-protected device that has been lawfully seized with a warrant. These
courts may not only misread precedent but, in doing so, bring us back to the world
of Boyd entanglement.213 The entanglement does not stop there. After this critical
determination, courts handle the next step differently. Some have opined that the
government must know with reasonable particularity the existence, possession, and
authenticity of specific documents.214 Much of this cannot be known without access
to the device itself. Meanwhile, others flatly reject the application of the foregone
conclusion exception. 215 Needless to say, the malleable characteristics of this
doctrine are too numerous to apply consistently. This has plagued the Fifth
Amendment inquiry.216
Andrews, 234 A.3d at 1274 (“The distinction becomes even more problematic when considering
that, at least in some cases, a biometric device lock can be established only after a passcode is
created, calling into question the testimonial/non-testimonial distinction in this context.”).

212

213

See infra Part II.C.

See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 1335, 1346 (11th
Cir. 2012) (“[I]f the Government can show with ‘reasonable particularity’ that, at the time it sought
to compel the act of production, it already knew of the materials, thereby making any testimonial
aspect a ‘foregone conclusion.’”); see also G.A.Q.L. v. State, 257 So. 3d 1058, 1063–64 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2018) (holding that the foregone conclusion exception applies, but applying the reasonable
particularity requirement to the underlying documents).

214

Seo v. State, 148 N.E.3d 952, 958 (Ind. 2020) (“Though the foregone conclusion exception does
not apply to these facts, this case underscores several reasons why the narrow exception may be
generally unsuitable to the compelled production of any unlocked smartphone.”); Commonwealth
v. Davis, 220 A.3d 534, 549 (Pa. 2019) (“Based upon the United States Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence surveyed above, it becomes evident that the foregone conclusion gloss on a Fifth
Amendment analysis constitutes an extremely limited exception . . . .” (emphasis added)).

215

See generally Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Toward a Unified Theory of Testimonial Evidence
Under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, 80 Temp. L. Rev. 1135, 1140–42 (2007) (discussing the current
“testimonial” characterization differences under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments).
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According to two sitting Justices, this obfuscation is a byproduct of the
increasingly unworkable testimonial versus non-testimonial distinction. 217 After
all, the testimonial versus non-testimonial distinction is the foundation of the act
of production doctrine.218 The Andrews majority, and other jurists, have called into
question this entire principle.219 Perhaps these device decryption cases present the
perfect storm, so to speak. Maybe this is the “future case” where Justices Thomas
and Gorsuch separately agreed they would be willing to reconsider the
Self-Incrimination Clause. In the next section, I will briefly summarize their
opinions.
C. Revisiting the Fifth Amendment’s “to be a witness”
Earlier, brief mention was made to the Supreme Court’s holding in United States
v. Hubbell.220 In that case, the majority refused to apply the foregone conclusion
exception. 221 With reluctance, Justice Thomas concurred. 222 Because Thomas
believed the Court properly applied the doctrine, he joined the majority;223 but he
did not stop there. Thomas emphatically stated his willingness “to reconsider the
scope and meaning of the Self-Incrimination Clause.”224
More recently, Justice Gorsuch took issue with Self-Incrimination Clause
jurisprudence while dissenting in Carpenter v. United States.225 There, the Court faced
a difficult intersection of advanced technology and its Fourth Amendment
217

See infra Part II.C.

218

See supra Part I.B.

State v. Andrews, 234 A.3d 1254, 1274 (N.J. 2020) (“The [testimonial/non-testimonial]
distinction becomes even more problematic when considering that, at least in some cases, a
biometric device lock can be established only after a passcode is created, calling into question the
testimonial/non-testimonial distinction in this context.” (alteration added)); see also infra Part II.C
(discussing other jurists who believe the testimonial versus non-testimonial distinction should no
longer be followed).

219

220

See supra Part I.B; see also United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 43–45 (2000).

Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 44 (“Whatever the scope of this ‘foregone conclusion’ rationale, the facts
of this case plainly fall outside of it.”).

221

Id. at 49 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I join the opinion of the Court because it properly applies
this [act-of-production] doctrine, but I write separately to note that this doctrine may be
inconsistent with the original meaning of the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause.”
(alteration added)).

222

223

Id.

Id. (“In a future case, I would be willing to reconsider the scope and meaning of the SelfIncrimination Clause.”).

224

225

Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2271 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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implications. 226 While Carpenter was largely decided on Fourth Amendment
grounds, Gorsuch made some germane remarks regarding the Fifth Amendment.227
Importantly, he made clear his wariness of a return to the entangled doctrine of
Boyd.228 Gorsuch believed the Boyd doctrine had “prove[n] unworkable.”229 While
alluding to “substantial evidence” of the original understanding of compelled
production of incriminating evidence, Justice Gorsuch continued, “We would do
well to reconsider the scope of the Fifth Amendment.”230 It is no surprise then that
the originalist work of Professor Nagareda had caught the attention of the justices.
Long before its complicated extension into compelled decryption, Professor
Nagareda pointed out the larger folly in Fisher’s act of production doctrine.
Addressing the root of the doctrine’s fundamental flaw, Professor Nagareda blamed
the Court for continued misconstruction—or utter lack of “reasoned analysis”—of
the text of the U.S. Constitution.231 He continued, “It is precisely because the Court
has not parsed the phrase ‘to be a witness’ but, instead, has defined it only indirectly
and by implication that the Court has meandered along a mistaken doctrinal path
for more than a century.”232
Following what was, in his view, the proper path, Professor Nagareda looked to
the original meaning of the text and the context within which James Madison
penned the phrase “to be a witness.”233 Nagareda focused on “the absence of outcry
upon Madison’s change in language; the understanding of the noun ‘witness’ in
contemporaneous sources on language; the use of similar language elsewhere in the
Constitution; and, perhaps most tellingly, contemporaneous common law, which

Id. at 2211–13 (majority opinion) (discussing the status of cell-site location and the issues
regarding the Fourth Amendment).

226

227

Id. at 2271 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).

228

Id. (“To be sure, we must be wary of returning to the doctrine of Boyd v. United States . . . .”).

Id. (“Boyd invoked the Fourth Amendment to restrict the use of subpoenas even for ordinary
business records and, as Justice Alito notes, eventually proved unworkable.”).

229

Id. (“Our precedents treat the right against self-incrimination as applicable only to
testimony, not the production of incriminating evidence. But there is substantial evidence that
the privilege against self-incrimination was also originally understood to protect a person from
being forced to turn over potentially incriminating evidence.” (citation omitted)).
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See Nagareda, supra note 25, at 1602 (“It would be one thing if the distinction were the product
of reasoned analysis—indeed, of any analysis—of the language and history of the Fifth
Amendment.”).

231

232

Id.

233

Id. at 1604–15.
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clearly barred the compelled production of self-incriminatory documents.”234 From
this historical context, Nagareda concluded that “to be a witness” must be
equivalent to the phrase to “give evidence.”235
Turning back to Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Hubbell, he began his analysis
much like that of Professor Nagareda—focusing on the word “witness.”236 Echoing
Nagareda’s concerns about the lack of “reasoned analysis” based on the text and its
meaning at the time of the founding, Justice Thomas embarked on that historical
journey to determine the originalist meaning of “to be a witness.” 237 Looking to
dictionaries published around the time and the eighteenth century common law
privilege against self-incrimination, Thomas viewed these broad protections as
“enshrined in the Virginia Declaration of Rights in 1776.” 238 Importantly, that
document stated, “no one may ‘be compelled to give evidence against himself,” and
seven other States adopted that specific provision.239 Subsequently, when ratifying
the Federal Constitution, similarly worded proposals were put forth by several of
those states.240
Cautiously, Justice Thomas mentioned Boyd v. United States, a case that has
received significant attention in act of production doctrine cases.241 The Boyd Court
dealt with a complicated statute related to searches and seizures, which helps

234

Id. at 1607.

Id. at 1603 (“To compel a person ‘to be a witness,’ properly understood, is to compel that
person ‘to give evidence’; and it is the compulsion of that act of giving evidence in itself—whether
in the form of speech, production of preexisting documents, or otherwise—that violates the Fifth
Amendment.”).

235

United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 49–50 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The key word
at issue in this case is ‘witness.’ The Court’s opinion, relying on prior cases, essentially defines
‘witness’ as a person who provides testimony, and thus restricts the Fifth Amendment’s ban to
only those communications ‘that are “testimonial” in character.’” (citation omitted)).

236

Id. at 50 (“None of this Court’s cases, however, has undertaken an analysis of the meaning of
the term at the time of the founding. A review of that period reveals substantial support for the
view that the term ‘witness’ meant a person who gives or furnishes evidence, a broader meaning
than that which our case law currently ascribes to the term.”).

237

Importantly, that document stated “no one may ‘be compelled to give evidence against
himself,” and seven other states adopted that specific provision.

238

239

Id. at 52.

Id. (“And during ratification of the Federal Constitution, the four States that proposed bills
of rights put forward draft proposals employing similar wording for a federal constitutional
provision guaranteeing the right against compelled self-incrimination.”).

240

241

Id. at 55–56; see Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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partially to explain the complex holding. 242 The Boyd majority confusingly
intertwined the Fourth and Fifth Amendment.243 For the better part of a century,
subsequent decisions by the Court chipped away at Boyd.244 Fisher flatly rejected the
entangled reading.245 Meanwhile, some believe the negative treatment of Boyd is
misguided, especially Justice Miller’s concurrence.246
Without saying much else, Justice Miller stated it was “quite clear” that failure
to produce incriminating papers “is within the protection which the constitution
intended against compelling a person to be a witness against himself.”247 So while

Boyd, 116 U.S. at 619–20 (quoting language from the statute at issue); see also Nagareda, supra
note 25, at 1586 (“The statute that authorized the court order was particularly draconian, providing
that a refusal to produce the specified document ‘shall be taken’ as a ‘confess[ion]’ of the
government’s underlying allegations.” (alteration in original)).

242

Boyd, 116 U.S. at 633 (“We have already noticed the intimate relation between the two
amendments. They throw great light on each other. For the ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’
condemned in the fourth amendment are almost always made for the purpose of compelling a
man to give evidence against himself, which in criminal cases is condemned in the fifth
amendment; and compelling a man ‘in a criminal case to be a witness against himself,’ which is
condemned in the fifth amendment, throws light on the question as to what is an ‘unreasonable
search and seizure’ within the meaning of the fourth amendment. And we have been unable to
perceive that the seizure of a man’s private books and papers to be used in evidence against him
is substantially different from compelling him to be a witness against himself.”).

243

See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 414–15 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[This
decision] is but another step in the denigration of privacy principles settled nearly 100 years ago
in Boyd v. United States . . . .” (alteration added); see also Nagareda, supra note 25, at 1578 (“In the
century since Boyd, the Court has steadily retreated from this position, even as the Court has
extended dramatically the protection the Fifth Amendment gives to self-incriminatory
statements. In the wake of the Court’s 1976 decision in Fisher v. United States and its progeny,
observers accurately have described Boyd as ‘dead.’”).

244

See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409 (“To the extent, however, that the rule against compelling
production of private papers rested on the proposition that seizures of or subpoenas for ‘mere
evidence,’ including documents, violated the Fourth Amendment and therefore also transgressed
the Fifth, the foundations for the rule have been washed away.” (citation omitted)).

245

246

See generally Boyd, 116 U.S. at 638–41 (Miller, J., concurring).

Id. at 639 (“And I am quite satisfied that the effect of the act of congress is to compel the party
on whom the order of the court is served to be a witness against himself. . . . That this is within
the protection which the constitution intended against compelling a person to be a witness against
himself, is, I think, quite clear.”). But see Nagareda, supra note 25, at 1590 (“Justice Miller did not
help his intellectual legacy by omitting the reasoning behind his conclusion. What was ‘quite clear’
to Justice Miller in 1886 is precisely what has eluded the Court as a whole in the century that
followed. My enterprise here ultimately is to resurrect the Fifth Amendment holding of Boyd . . .
by explaining the soundness of Justice Miller’s view.”).

247
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most agree that the Boyd majority view of the intertwined Fourth and Fifth
Amendment is incorrect, Justice Thomas aptly stated one thing that should be clear:
“this Court unanimously held that the Fifth Amendment protects a defendant
against compelled production of books and papers.”248
At least for Justices Thomas and Gorsuch, their solution is faithful to the text of
the Constitution. Reading “witness” as synonymous with “to furnish evidence”
would result in wholesale change to the Fifth Amendment protection against
compelled self-incrimination. At first glance, it also seems more clear-cut and
simpler. But is simplicity always better? And would enough Justices decide to
render useless decades worth of precedent on the act of production doctrine? It is
at least plausible that the recent confusion regarding the device decryption and the
foregone conclusion exception may motivate the Supreme Court to revisit the
doctrine.
This Article envisions the future of the foregone conclusion doctrine through
the lens of Thomas, Gorsuch, and Nagareda. While other approaches have lasted,
some argue that they are unfaithful to the precedent and the Constitution.
Continuing down the current path will grant us precedent only deriving from the
ether. Not only that, but this entanglement of the Fourth Amendment and Fifth
Amendment self-incrimination protection has been almost unanimously rejected.
Although Justice Thomas called the entire act of production doctrine into question,
it is not quite clear that the new regime would be much clearer. Could a foregone
conclusion-type doctrine survive? That analysis is the subject of the final Part.
III. COMPELLED DECRYPTION AND THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF “TO BE A
WITNESS”

If the original meaning of “be a witness” were revived, producing private papers
would be considered “furnishing evidence.”249 Certainly, the government may still
search and seize, or “take,” documents pursuant to the Fourth Amendment. But
they could no longer compel production, or compel “giving,” of incriminating
documents under the Fifth Amendment. Thus, document production would not
survive in its current form, if it survives at all. There would be no further use for the
testimonial versus non-testimonial distinction. As an exception to the act of
production doctrine, foregone conclusions would be a thing of the past. The new
interpretation would certainly be more sweeping and afford individuals greater
248

United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 55 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring).

See Nagareda, supra note 25, at 1605 (“The most plausible construction of the phrase ‘to be a
witness’ is as the equivalent of the phrase ‘to give evidence’ found in contemporaneous state
sources.”).

249
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Fifth Amendment protection. At first blush, this new interpretation seems to
suggest the government could not compel decryption of devices. But it is easy to see
potential complications under the originalist interpretation. In this Part, I will
discuss several uncomfortable uncertainties that may accompany compelled
decryption under the new regime. Finally, I will turn to discuss the application of
the new interpretation to the dueling cases in Pennsylvania and New Jersey.
A. Give or Take—It’s Not That Simple
The importance of the Court defining “give” and “take” cannot be overstated. A
poor interpretation could bring us right back to the testimonial versus nontestimonial regime. 250 While it is hard to speculate on the future of the
Self-Incrimination Clause, the troublesome testimonial inquiry will no longer
exist. 251 Even though Justices Thomas and Gorsuch both cited to Professor
Nagareda’s article, it would be reaching to suggest they wholly adopt the views in
the article beyond the extensive research into the original meaning. This Article
does not want to speculate based on a single Thomas concurrence252 and a Gorsuch
dissent, citing that Thomas concurrence.253 It is indisputable, however, that these
jurists want to revisit the doctrine based on the original meaning.
For argument’s sake, this Article will proceed with the revisionist view put
forward by Nagareda. That is, while the government has power through the Fourth
Amendment to “take” evidence unilaterally, the Fifth Amendment protects
individuals from being compelled to “give” evidence. 254 In place of the extinct
testimonial versus non-testimonial distinction, courts evaluating a subpoena to
compel entering a passcode to an iPhone would only have to ask whether the
government compelled the person to “give evidence.” That should be easier than the
testimonial versus non-testimonial distinction. One cannot be so sure. After all,
would courts now have to define what it means to “give” and to “take”?
To exemplify this dilemma, it is helpful to look at some examples offered by
Id. at 1602 (“The creation of a separate, less protective, unduly complicated, and wrong set of
Fifth Amendment principles for document subpoenas stems, at bottom, from the modern Court’s
implicit construction of the phrase ‘to be a witness’ in terms of testimonial communication.”).

250

Id. at 1640 (“The implications for document subpoenas are clear enough: The act-ofproduction doctrine announced in Fisher would be added to the list of wisely discarded
constitutional doctrine.”).

251

252

See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 50–51 (Thomas, J., concurring).

253

See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2271 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).

See Nagareda, supra note 25, at 1623 (“A reading of the phrase ‘to be a witness’ as synonymous
with the phrase ‘to give evidence’ would lend unity to Fifth Amendment doctrine . . . .”).
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Professor Nagareda. First, consider when the government compels a suspect to
stand in a lineup. 255 This compelled physical act, according to Nagareda, would
clearly be constitutional under the new framework.256 That is because a suspect’s
body would be considered “legitimately in police custody, in the same manner as the
police might have obtained custody, through a duly authorized seizure, of a locked
safe or computer . . . .”257 Unhelpfully explained, this was because the government
could “through its own investigative savvy, plus the help of Madame Tussaud’s Wax
Museum—ha[ve] constructed a highly accurate life-size model of a particular
person and then, say, placed on the model the suspicious garment or propped up
the model in a police lineup.”258 According to that rationale, so long as the object or
person is in legitimate police custody, any acts incidental to that power to arrest
would be considered constitutionally “taking” evidence.259
Similarly, this rationale could justify compelled giving of blood. Since “the
Fourth Amendment places the ‘persons’ of ‘the people’ on par with their ‘papers, and
effects,’” the giving of blood could be seen as a taking by the government.260 That is,
in Nagareda’s view, it is “taking” blood; since it requires the target to do nothing,
they “literally ha[ve] to sit still,” like the person in legitimate police custody standing
in a lineup.261 Again, we are left with an imperfect analogy that I am hesitant to
accept.
My hesitation stems from two places: (1) the qualifying phrase amounting to “if
the government can use its own investigative savvy”; and (2) Nagareda’s explanation
that “[t]he garment and lineup cases are readily explicable on the ground that,
having legitimately seized the person of the defendant, the government effectively
has constructed a life-sized model of the person’s body. And, having done so, the
government should be no worse off with the person’s actual body legitimately in its
custody than the government would have been if it had constructed a life-size
model.”262
255

Id. at 1627–28; see generally United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).

Nagareda, supra note 25, at 1627 (“There plainly would be no Fifth Amendment
objection . . . .”).

256

257

Id.

258

Id. at 1627–28 (alteration added).

Id. at 1628 (“[T]he mere exhibition of a person in a police lineup, like exhibition at trial itself,
‘is an incident of the State’s power to arrest, and a reasonable and justifiable aspect of the State’s
custody resulting from arrest.’”).

259

260

Id. at 1627.

261

Id. (alteration added).

262

Id. at 1627–28.
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Applying this to the device context, does this mean that if the government
through its own technological savvy, with the potential help of some hackers, could
decrypt your device, then they could lawfully compel you to perform the act of
entering the passcode? After all, the government lawfully has seized the phone and
could hack it, shouldn’t they be “no worse off”? If that were the case, our Fifth
Amendment protection would ebb and flow with the advances in government
investigative technology.
It just so happens that Nagareda analogized the drawing of blood to permissible
device searches under the originalist regime.263 Since the government could search
devices so long as the defendant would just “sit still—figuratively—while the police
might use their own ingenuity to gain access.”264 Because taking a locked device and
searching it is fine, so too here, the unilateral taking of blood would be valid. In the
suspect’s case, his body is analogous to the device. The government drawing blood
is the government extracting data. Nagareda defines each of these instances as
“taking evidence.”
To complicate matters, in the same stroke where Nagareda allowed device
searches, he thought there was a meaningful distinction between drawing blood
and lineups versus document subpoenas. 265 Nagareda claimed the whole reason
compelling document production was prohibited “is that the government could not
have constructed the document through its own police work.”266
Unfortunately, if we draw the line precisely at government capabilities through
its own police work, this creates distinctions based on form rather than substance.
For instance, biometric passcodes could permissibly be compelled, whereas
numerical passcodes likely would not be. And then, we would also have a malleable
Fifth Amendment protection based on police capabilities. Perhaps there is more to
it than just that. In his discussion of handwriting and voice exemplars, we get some
clearer analogs to device decryption.267
According to Nagareda, voice or handwriting exemplars could not be
compelled—it would be “giving.” 268 Perhaps the most helpful instruction on the

263

Id. at 1627.

264

Id.

Id. at 1628 (“[T]wo of the later bodily evidence cases—involving the compelled generation of
handwriting and voice exemplars—are much closer calls.”).

265

266

Id.

267

Id. at 1628–29.

Id. at 1629 (“What the government may not do is to compel the person to produce exemplars
in order to provide a link in the chain of incriminatory evidence.”).

268
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issue comes from Justice Fortas’s dissent in part in Gilbert v. California.269 In Gilbert,
the Court was faced with several questions, including whether compelled
handwriting exemplars violated the Self-Incrimination Clause. 270 The majority
believed it constitutional. 271 Dissenting in part, Justice Fortas provided some
insight when arguing that such samples should not be permitted. 272 Unlike the
suspect in a lineup, a defendant giving the handwriting sample is “compelled to
cooperate, not merely to submit; to engage in a volitional act, not merely to suffer
the inevitable consequences of arrest and state custody; to take affirmative action
which may not merely identify him, but tie him directly to the crime.”273 On the
same day this case was decided, Justice Fortas took issue with voice exemplars as
well.274
In United States v. Wade, the Supreme Court upheld compelled speech during
lineup identifications. 275 Again, dissenting in part, Justice Fortas believed
compelled voice exemplars were unconstitutional. 276 In his view, rather than
“passive, mute assistance to the eyes of the victim . . . [i]t is the kind of volitional
act—the kind of forced cooperation by the accused—which is within the historical
permeter [sic] of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination.”277 It is here
where a different line drawn might doom compelled decryption. Compelled
physical decryption of one’s device could be considered the sort of “cooperat[ion]”
and “volitional acts” that troubled Justice Fortas.278
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 290–92 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).

269

270

Id. at 265 (majority opinion).

Id. at 266 (“The taking of the exemplars did not violate petitioner’s Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.”).

271

272

Id. at 290–92 (Fortas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

273

Id. at 291–92.

See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 260–62 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).

274

Id. at 222–23 (majority opinion) (“[C]ompelling Wade to speak within hearing distance of the
witness, even to utter words purportedly uttered by the robber, was not compulsion to utter
statements of a ‘testimonial’ nature; he was required to use his voice as an identifying physical
characteristic, not to speak his guilt.”).

275

Id. at 260 (Fortas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he accused may not be
compelled in a lineup to speak the words uttered by the person who committed the crime.”).

276

277

Id.

Id.; see also Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 291–92 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (distinguishing compelled handwriting exemplars from drawing blood
samples).
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Personal devices, especially cell phones, are different than physical documents,
and the Court has shown a willingness to treat them as such.279 The technological
differences render it nearly impossible to draw clean-cut comparisons to centuriesold examples. In the case of encrypted devices, the government already possesses
the storage-keeping device, pursuant to a lawful warrant. The government has
already taken possession of the evidence—the physical device that contains the
incriminating contents. A lawful warrant gives them the right to search, seize, and
take the contents within. But technological advances have made the device
impenetrable—incomparable to a safe or strongbox. In so doing, an entire universe
of documents could be unreachable from any government policing efforts—even
pursuant to a lawful warrant based on probable cause. This is unlike any safe or
strongbox that the government could physically take and break open through the
use of force.
Without comfortable comparisons, courts must discern why the physical act of
standing in a lineup is valid “take” evidence for the government, whereas handing
over a key is impermissible “give” evidence. And so, another potential rationale
could arise by recycling Justice Fortas’s language, which could suggest that entering
the passcode “is an incident of the State’s power to” search and seize the device.280
Then, requiring the defendant to remove a barrier to the government’s lawful access
could be considered incidental to the government’s power to search pursuant to a
warrant. 281 Thus, compelling the passcode would be a “reasonable and justifiable
aspect of the State’s custody” of the cell phone itself.282
The trouble I see, again, is that defining “give” and “take” is not so simple.
Courts may be forced to draw these other distinctions that may also not be derived
from the Constitution’s text. As I noted above, the definition of “give” could turn on
distinctions like cooperation versus submission,283 if the government could recreate
See generally Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018); see also Riley v. California, 573
U.S. 373, 385–400 (2014) (analyzing the complications that cell phones pose in the Fourth
Amendment context).
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Wade, 388 U.S. at 259–60 (Fortas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he
exhibition of the person of the accused at a lineup is not itself a violation of the privilege against
self-incrimination. In itself, it is no more subject to constitutional objection than the exhibition
of the person of the accused in the courtroom for identification purposes. It is an incident of the
State’s power to arrest, and a reasonable and justifiable aspect of the State’s custody resulting
from arrest.”).

280

281

Id.

282

Id.

Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 291 (Fortas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[C]ompelled to
cooperate, not merely to submit . . . .”).
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the evidence sought by its own investigative savvy,284 whether the suspect sits still
versus performs a volitional act,285 or acts incidental to the state’s power to seize,
versus non-incidental.286 These complex distinctions look eerily familiar, not only
to the testimonial versus non-testimonial, but also to the quote in Fisher, “The
question is not of testimony but of surrender.”287 Similarly, this Article has noted
how courts have long struggled with the “key to the strongbox” versus “code to a wall
safe” dicta.288
What is clear is that under this new regime, compelled decryption of devices
would be unclear. While document subpoenas would certainly not be permitted,
this Article has noted how device passcodes would be treated differently from
documents. After all, the government has already taken the evidence they want to
look at—the cell phone or computer. It has legal authority and possession over the
phone and its contents. The passcode likely provides little to no evidentiary value,
beyond access to the device. It is simply a hurdle or barrier. So will courts look at
the passcode as “giving” a piece of evidence, or simply a barrier impeding the
government’s lawful authority to “take”? In this context, a lawful Fourth
Amendment search warrant giving the government legal possession and access,
runs head-on into the Fifth Amendment barrier.
While at first blush, the originalist regime seems to grant broader protections
to criminal defendants, decrypting the new definition will not be so simple.
Although the originalist definition certainly clarifies document subpoenas better
than the testimonial or non-testimonial understanding, we may be no better off in
the passcode context. Not only that, currently settled Fifth Amendment questions
would become unsettled; namely, handwriting and voice exemplars. In the device
See Nagareda, supra note 25, at 1627–28 (“There plainly would be no Fifth Amendment
objection if the government—through its own investigative savvy, plus the help of Madame
Tussaud’s Wax Museum—had constructed a highly accurate life-size model of a particular person
and then, say, placed on the model the suspicious garment or propped up the model in a police
lineup.”).
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Wade, 388 U.S. at 260 (Fortas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[Compelled
speech in a lineup] is the kind of volitional act . . . which is within the historical permeter [sic] of
the privilege against compelled self-incrimination.” (alteration added)).
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See Nagareda, supra note 25, at 1628 (“Justice Fortas was on the right track, noting that the
mere exhibition of a person in a police lineup, like exhibition at trial itself, ‘is an incident of the
State’s power to arrest, and a reasonable and justifiable aspect of the State’s custody resulting
from arrest.’”) (quoting Wade, 388 U.S. at 259–60 (Fortas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)).

286
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Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976) (quoting In re Harris, 221 U.S. 274, 279 (1911)).
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See supra Part II.B.
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decryption context, would there be a meaningful difference between writing down
a passcode versus being compelled to manually enter the code? Difficult questions
certainly will arise.
B. Application to Davis and Andrews
We can make two observations about the holdings in Commonwealth v. Davis and
State v. Andrews. First, the original meaning of the Self-Incrimination Clause would
protect Davis and Andrews from being compelled to give the government their
passcodes. Both cases involved compelled giving of the written passcode, rather
than compelled entering. 289 These facts are more along the lines of compelled
documentary evidence, which would become extinct under the “furnish evidence”
reading. Second, if it were a compelled act of entering a passcode, it may well still
warrant protection under the Self-Incrimination Clause. If that is the case,
compelling decryption of a device would flatly be prohibited. I think that reading is
more likely. This, however, may be uncertain due to the complexities accompanying
devices.
Much like Justice Thomas, this Article concurs with the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania in Davis because the Davis majority properly applied the current
doctrine.290 As suggested throughout this article, however, both Davis and Andrews
rest on a problematic premise. If the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause
is revised to an originalist interpretation, Fisher and its progeny will become
inconsequential. Interpreting the Clause to prohibit compelled “furnishing” of
evidence may make the document production doctrine clearer. This new approach,
however, requires that courts deal differently with device decryption. Courts will
be confronted with uncertainties similar to the ones mentioned above. Not only
that, judges will have to deal with uncomfortable distinctions based on form rather
than substance.
There are inevitable difficulties determining what exactly it means to “give” and
to “take.” For instance, in the context of personal devices, imagine the government
lawfully seizes a device and has a search warrant for its contents. But still, the
government cannot get past the encryption. Is compelling the person in custody
to enter the passcode, more like “taking” blood and standing in a lineup? Conversely,
is it more like asking someone to “give” over their documents?
See Davis, 220 A.3d at 539 (“[T]he Commonwealth filed . . . a pre-trial motion to compel
Appellant to divulge the password to his [device].” (alteration added) (emphasis added)); see also
Andrews, 234 A.3d at 1261 (“The State therefore moved to compel Andrews to disclose the passcodes
to his two iPhones.” (emphasis added)).
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See supra Part II.B.1.
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The standing in a lineup analogy is imperfect. It is unlike the situation outlined
by Professor Nagareda. The defendant does not merely have to sit still but would
have to physically push the buttons or keys to decrypt. That rationale, however,
would also apply to the criminal defendant standing in a lineup. The criminal
defendant would have to physically get dressed and stand in the lineup. True, the
government could employ a wax sculptor, but what does one make of this analogy?
The fact is, if the government did make a wax sculpture of the defendant, the
defendant would not be compelled whatsoever to “give” anything. Moreover, it
would likely have less evidentiary value than the physical person standing there.
Professor Nagareda’s document production argument is also of no avail. Recall,
Nagareda argued that in the context of document production, the government
could not compel production since they could not produce the documents through
their own police work.291 But that rationale is flawed. While the government may
never be able to recreate the contents of a document without seeing it, the
government would eventually be able to decrypt a passcode. The government could
employ the world’s best hackers, analogous to Madame Tussaud’s Wax Museum
experts. Would a court then have to determine how likely or burdensome it would
be for the government to produce the evidence on their own? 292 Or, is the mere
possibility that the government could get the evidence through their own police work
enough to allow compelled decryption? Surely, Fifth Amendment protection could
not turn on such a malleable characteristic.
It should be easy to see the complications of the original meaning; namely,
determining the difference between to “give” versus to “take.” While a defendant or
suspect clearly cannot be forced to testify in court, give an oral or written statement,
or hand over incriminating documents, other areas seem murky. That grey area
would include devices, but also formerly settled cases of handwriting and voice
exemplars. True, some may argue that we have fixed the act-of-production doctrine
by destroying it and faithfully returning to the original meaning of the Constitution.
But that may not make the doctrine any easier to apply, especially in the area of
compelled device decryption.
291

See supra Part III.A.

Perhaps a solution is to strip the passcode itself of its evidentiary value. For instance, if the
government compels the passcode, evidence of the act must be barred from use at a subsequent
trial. Formalistically, this might survive under the new interpretation. For one, the Government
already has unilaterally taken the device. They lawfully are given the right to access the contents.
The passcode then becomes the only target of compulsion. Rather than evidence itself, it is a
hurdle or barrier to lawful government access. If that is not—and cannot be—considered
“evidence,” perhaps the government can compel it. For now, it is too early to speculate.

292

95

THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

20:1 (2021)

CONCLUSION

One may now see the appeal of continuing with the testimonial versus nontestimonial distinction. Because it is quite clear that no matter the interpretation,
distinctions will have to be made or some arbitrary line be drawn. No matter the
doctrine, there will certainly be cases where the government takes evidence
pursuant to the Fourth Amendment that encroach uncomfortably on the Fifth
Amendment prohibition against compelling an individual to furnish evidence. And
so, while Justices Thomas and Gorsuch wait for the right future case to revisit the
Fifth Amendment, it is hard to believe that the case will be a model of clarity.
Difficult questions and uncertainties will arise even with the simpler sounding
originalist meaning. That said, courts must decide whether difficult future
questions justify remaining unfaithful to the text of the Constitution.
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